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The Legal Framework of Soviet
Foreign Trade*
Thomas W. Hoya**
r. INTRODUCTION
How can socialist internationalism be translated from an
ideal into an economic reality? For the Soviet Union and East-
ern Europe, answering this question has meant developing a for-
eign trade system suited to centrally planned economies.
This article will describe the resulting legal framework of
Soviet foreign trade, first in the context of Soviet trade with
the other countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assis-
tance (Comecon)." Comecon foreign trade will then be con-
trasted with Anglo-Soviet trade, an example of intercourse be-
tween a market and a centrally planned economy that may be-
come a model for expanded American trade with any of the
Comecon countries. Probable future trends in the foreign trade
legal structure of the Comecon countries will be discussed in the
conclusion. In foreign trade as in their domestic economies, these
countries are increasingly seeking efficiency through decen-
tralization and are developing the law accordingly.
* Research and writing of this article was done in the Soviet
Union and at Columbia University. For the opportunity to work in the
Soviet Union, the author is indebted to the American-Soviet Academic
Exchange administered by the Inter-University Committee on Travel
Grants. For the opportunity to work at Columbia University, the au-
thor is indebted to a Fellowship from the Foreign Area Fellowship
Program. The author is particularly grateful to Professor John N.
Hazard of Columbia University for his indispensable aid in the prepara-
tion of this article. All conclusions, opinions and other statements in
the article are, of course, the responsibility of the author alone.
This article was submitted in partial fulfillment of the require-
ments for the degree of Doctor of the Science of Law in the Faculty of
Law, Columbia University.
** Assistant Chief Counsel for Authorizations, Office of Foreign
Direct Investments, Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C. The
views expressed here are the author's and do not necessarily reflect those
of any government agency.
1. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon),
sometimes translated the Council for Mutual Economic Aid, was estab-
lished in 1949. Member countries are: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
East Germany, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Rumania and the Soviet
Union. Albania apparently retains formal membership, but since 1962
has not participated actively in the organization. The Council for Mu-
tual Economic Assistance is abbreviated in English language literature
as CMEA, as CEMA and as Comecon. In this paper it is always ab-
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The foreign trade system of Comecon's centrally planned
economies is significant for other countries not only in their trade
with the Comecon countries. It has meaning as well for the
world's developing countries in the organization of their own
foreign trade, because in many of these countries the government
plays an important role in the national economy. Similarly, the
experience of the Comecon countries has relevance for the de-
veloped market economy countries of the West, where the trend
is toward progressively greater governmental influence over
foreign trade.
II. COMECON FOREIGN TRADE
In each Comecon country, foreign trade is a government
monopoly. The national means of production are owned by
the government, and foreign trade and the economy as a whole
are centrally planned. 2 The government does not, however, ex-
ercise its foreign trade monopoly to the extent of conducting in
its sovereign capacity the actual export and import operations.
Instead, the government authorizes juridically independent state
corporations to conduct these operations.A Thus, in the Soviet
Union actual foreign trade is conducted primarily by 52 state
foreign trade corporations, each organized as an independent le-
gal entity with capacity to enter into contracts on world mark-
ets and to sue and be sued at home and abroad.4
breviated as Comecon. The paper's description of Comecon foreign trade
is based essentially on the Soviet Union's participation in it. Other
members' participation in Comecon trade may show variations from the
Soviet model that are not indicated.
Research for the paper was done primarily with Soviet materials.
Research sources include secondary written materials and conversa-
tions had by this author with jurists, economists and trade officials
of the Comecon countries for matters where primary written materials
do not exist.
2. See generally L. LUNz (also frequently transliterated Lunts),
MEZHDUNARODNOE CHASTNOE PRAVO-OSOBENNAIA CHAST' (PRIVATE INTER-
NATIONAL LAw-SPECIAL PART) 107-08 (1963) [hereinafter cited as LUNZ,
SPECIAL PART]; E. USENKO, FORMY REGULIROVANIIA SOTSIALISTICIIESKOGO
MEZHDUNARODNOGO RAZDELENIIA TRUDA (FORMS OF REGULATION OF SOCIAL-
IST INTERNATIONAL DIVISION OF LABOR) 283 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
USENKO].
3. LUNZ, SPECIAL PART, supra note 2, at 109; USENKO, supra note 2,
at 285-87; Knapp, The Function, Organization and Activities of Foreign
Trade Corporations in the European Socialist Countries, in Tin SOURCES
OF THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 52 (C. Schmitthoff ed. 1964) [com-
plete work hereinafter cites as SOURCES OF LAW]; Schmitthoff, The
Law of International Trade, its Growth, Formulation and Operation, in
SOURCES OF LAW, supra, at 3, 8-9; Szaszy, State Trading Activities in
Hungary, 20 VAND. L. REv. 393, 414-20 (1967).
4. D. RAMZAITSEV, DOGOVOR KUPLI-PRODAZHI VO VNESHNEI TORGOVLE
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The Comecon countries are attempting some multilateral
coordination of their national economic planning and Come-
con foreign trade. Nevertheless, they still found the basic legal
obligations in this foreign trade on bilateral arrangements.5
The basic operative bilateral documents are the inter-govern-
mental long term trade agreements, the inter-governmental an-
SSSR (THE CONTRACT OF PURCHASE AND SALE IN TE FOREIGN TRADE OF
THE USSR) 17-21 (1961) [hereinafter cited as RAmzAITsEv, CONTRACT];
V. SHEvcnENKo & A. SVETLOVA-GOLIAXOVA, VNESHNEurORGOVAIA KORRE-
SPoNDENTSEIA I DOxUwIENTATSIIA (FOREIGN TRADE CORRESPONDENCE AND
DOCUMENTATION) 165-71 (1966). Generally, each of these Soviet cor-
porations has a monopoly over the export and import of a designated
type of goods. The corporations are not producers or consumers of
goods, but rather perform a middleman role of exporting goods pro-
cured from domestic state enterprises, and of buying imports from
abroad for transfer to these operating enterprises.
In addition, the Soviet foreign trade system includes trade delega-
tions, which represent the state abroad in foreign trade matters as a
component of the Soviet diplomatic corps. A Soviet trade delegation,
unlike a Soviet foreign trade corporation, is not an independent legal
entity under Soviet law and does enjoy the state's sovereign immunity.
Consequently, it cannot sue or be sued unless subjected (as it fre-
quently is) to the jurisdiction of local courts by a treaty with the
relevant country. In recent years Soviet foreign trade has been con-
ducted primarily by the foreign trade corporations, which normally
negotiate and sign the contracts for exports and imports. The trade
delegations now exercise merely a general supervisory role in Soviet
trade. LuNz, SPECIAL PART, supra note 2, at 66; RAmzArrsnv, CoNTRACT
supra, at 17 n.1; UsENxo, supra note 2, at 269.
The work of both the foreign trade corporations and the trade dele-
gations is for the most part directed by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign
Trade. For a detailed description of the Soviet administration of foreign
trade, see Berman, The Legal Framework of Trade Between Planned
and Market Economies: The Soviet-American Example, 24 LAw &
CONTrEM. PROB. 482, 483-504 (1959), and a forthcoming book by J.
Quigley, Assistant Professor of Law, College of Law, Ohio State Uni-
versity.
Foreign trade in the East European countries is also conducted pri-
marily by middlemen foreign trade corporations. In several of these
countries in recent years, however, operating state economic enterprises
have increasingly been authorized to participate directly in foreign trade
operations without the middlemen foreign trade corporations. Grzy-
bowski, The Foreign Trade Regime in the Comecon Countries Today,
4 N.Y.U.J. INTL' L. & Poircs 183, 184-90 (1971); Katona, The Interna-
tional Sale of Goods among Member States of the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance, 9 CoLum. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 226, 231 (1970) [herein-
after cited as Katona]. See note 119 infra.
5. Babitchev, The International Bank for Economic Cooperation,
in MONEY AND PLAN: FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF EAST EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
REFoRMs 129, 146-47 (G. Grossman ed. 1968); Shonfield, Changing
Commercial Policies in the Soviet Bloc, 44 INTL AFFAIRS 1, 3-4 (1968).
Twenty-five bilateral long term trade agreements for 1961-65 were
concluded between Comecon countries following discussions in Come-
con on the coordination of member countries' national economic plan-
ning for this period. The Soviet Union was a party to seven of these
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nual trade protocols, and the contracts between the foreign
trade corporations of the two countries involvedA In addition,
the desirability of socialist international division of labor and
some of the institutional framework for its attainment are ex-
pressed in 30 bilateral treaties of friendship and mutual assistance,
14 bilateral trade and navigation treaties, the Charter of Comecon,
the Warsaw Pact and the 1962 multilateral declaration of Fund-
amental Principles of International Socialist Division of Labor.7
A. TYPES OF AGREEMENTS
Chronologically, the bilateral long term trade agreement is
the first of the documents creating a legal obligation actually
to export and import goods between the Comecon countries.
This agreement is usually negotiated and signed by the two for-
eign trade ministries representing their respective governments.
It is normally operative for a period coinciding with the several-
year national economic plan of each country, the periods of these
plans normally coinciding in the Comecon states. Five year plans
from 1971 through 1975 are currently in effect. Generally the
Comecon governments use the trade agreements to balance
their trade on a bilateral basis. 8 They are seeking, however,
agreements. USENKO, supra note 2, at 278-79, 408-09. In 1956 Comecon
had already begun work on coordinating member countries' planning
through 1980. Id. at 405-06. The extent of this multilateral coordina-
tion is significantly restricted by economic complexities and by the
resistance of some countries, notably Rumania.
6. See LUNZ, SPECIAL PART, supra note 2, at 109. Other types of
bilateral inter-governmental legal documents used in Comecon foreign
trade include: various agreements regulating payments, UsENKo, supra
note 2, at 350-74; credit agreements, id. at 298-318 (see note 8 infra for
one type of credit agreement); technical aid agreements, id. at 319-31;
agreements for the services of technical specialists and for the industrial
training of personnel, id. at 332-37; and agreements of scientific-techni-
cal cooperation, id. at 375-85.
7. USENKO, supra note 2, at 207-16, 221-22. Other foreign trade
multilateral agreements of the Comecon countries include: the General
Conditions for the Delivery of Goods (see notes 32-36 and accompanying
text infra), the General Conditions for the Installation of Plant and Ma-
chinery, id. at 338-49, the General Conditions for the Servicing of Ma-
chinery, Equipment, and Other Products, id., at 345, and the Comecon
1963 Agreement on Multilateral Clearing in Transferable Rubles and
Organization of the International Bank for Economic Cooperation (see
note 9 infra), id. at 369-74.
8. USENKO, supra note 2, at 293-96; Shonfield, supra note 5, at 3-4.
Sometimes a long term agreement may provide that one country is to
deliver its goods during a later period of years than the other. In this
situation the later-delivering country is considered to receive credit
during the years when it receives imports that it has not yet repaid with
exports. USENKO, supra note 2, at 272, 298-318. Usually the interest
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to develop a convertible currency and a multilateral balancing
system.9
The trade agreement indicates which goods in what amounts
are to be supplied by each side to the other, with deliveries
broken down by years. 10 Some standard for determining the
prices of individual goods is stipulated, usually that average
world market prices over a period of several years will be the
basis."' Provision is always made for periodic review of the pro-
gress of trade under the agreement by representatives of both
countries.' 2
In advance of each year a bilateral trade protocol is signed
to supplement the long term agreement.13 Normally it is exe-
cuted on behalf of the governments by their foreign trade minis-
tries. The protocols chief purpose is to adjust the provisions of
the long term agreement to current conditions, since during the
period of the long term agreement the national economies of the
two countries often develop foreign trade needs that were un-
rate is 2% annually, based on the amount of imports actually received
by the debtor and not yet repaid through exports. The payment of
interest and principal is through the delivery of goods. Id. at 312-13.
A new problem for the Soviet Union is to attempt to use the long
term trade agreement as a means of obtaining from Comecon importers
of Soviet oil and ore, such as Czechoslovakia and Poland, some compen-
sation for the additional investment that these exports require. As the
established, more accessible sources of these raw materials are gradu-
ally exhausted, the Soviet Union is being forced to invest heavily in the
development of new sources in less accessible regions. See N.Y. Times,
Aug. 8, 1971, § 1, at 1, coL 1, and at 21, col 1; id., Jan. 16, 1967 (Europe-
Mideast Business Review), at 43, cols. 4, 5-6; THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 13,
1968, at 35; id., Aug. 19, 1967, at xxxvii.
9. Comecon established the International Bank for Economic Co-
operation in October, 1963, and the International Investment Bank in
January, 1971, and announced further steps toward a convertible cur-
rency following a meeting in Bucharest in July, 1971. G. GARVY, MONEy,
BANING, AND CREDrr x EASTEm EuRoPE 103-07 (1966); K. Grazyow-
si, SovmE PRIvATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 96 (Law in Eastern Europe
No. 10, 1965); Babitchev, supra note 5, at 129-52; McQuade, U.S. Trade
with Eastern Europe: Its Prospects and Parameters, 3 LAW & POL. INT'L
Bus. 42, 52-59 (1971); Shonfield, supra note 5, at 3-4, 10; N. Y. Times,
Aug. 8, 1971, § 1 at 1, coL 1, and at 21, coL 1; icL, Jan. 2, 1971, § 1, at 27,
cols. 1-2.
10. See generally Usm-xo, supra note 2, at 282-83. In a long term
agreement or in an annual protocol, the goods scheduled for delivery
are normally set out in a separate list that forms an integral part of the
agreement or protocol
11. For a detailed discussion, see Katona, supra note 4, at 238-42.
See generally UsENxo, supra note 2, at 290-93.
12. USENKO, supra note 2, at 296-97.
13. It is normally signed in about September or October, and is
effective for the following calendar year.
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foreseen when the agreement was adopted. Along with this
adjustment function, the annual protocol specifies the foreign
trade for the coming year more precisely than the provisions of
the long term agreement. 1 4 Usually the protocol is drafted to
balance the year's bilateral trade.' 5
Essentially the annual protocol indicates for the coming year
the types and amounts of goods to be delivered. 10 When one
country during the course of the year develops an unexpected
need for an import not scheduled in the current year's protocol
and the country cannot wait for the following year's protocol, the
two foreign trade ministries can make a special agreement for
14. See Pozdniakov, Gosudarstvennaia Monopoliia Vneshnei Tor-
govli v SSSR i Vneshnetorgovye Sdelki Sovetskikh Khoziaistvennykh
Organizatsii (The State Monopoly of Foreign Trade in the USSR and
Foreign Trade Legal Acts of Soviet Economic Organizations), in PRAVO-
voE REGULIROVANIE VNESHNEI TORGOVLI SSSR (THE LEGAL REGULATION OF
FOREIGN TRADE OF THE USSR) 18, 34-35 (D. Genkin ed. 1961) [herein-
after cited as Pozdniakov]; USENKO, supra note 2, at 283-85. The
long term agreement may directly provide that in the annual protocols
the governments should try to increase the variety and quantities of
goods set out in the agreement, or the agreement may state that its
list of goods for delivery is simply a minimum obligation. UsENxo,
supra note 2, at 284.
15. Although each country generally drafts its long term agree-
ments and its annual protocols to maintain a bilateral balance of trade
with each of its Comecon partners, at the end of a year imbalances
sometimes appear. Possible causes include defaults in scheduled de-
liveries, additional deliveries made pursuant to special mid-year agree-
ments reached outside the protocol and variations in the actual prices
specified in the contracts between the foreign trade corporations from
the approximate prices used as a basis for computing the trade balances
in the annual protocol and long term agreement. Pozdniakov, supra
note 14, at 38; USENKo, supra note 2, at 294, 364.
In the situation of a trade imbalance, it was formerly provided by
the long term agreement that the deficit country would agree to export
an additional quantity of goods so as to reestablish the bilateral trade
balance by April 1 of the year immediately following the deficit year.
This system is still used in trade between a Comecon country and a
non-Comecon socialist country. In trade between Comecon countries, it
has apparently been altered since the establishment in 1963 of the Come-
con International Bank for Economic Cooperation. Pozdniakov, supra
note 14, at 37-38; USENKO, supra note 2, at 293-96, 364-66.
16. Sometimes delivery dates are broken down into quarters of
the year, and sometimes a price standard is provided that is more
specific than the standard in the long term agreement. See generally
Katona, supra note 4, at 238-42; Pozdniakov, supra note 14, at 34-35;
USENKO, supra note 2, at 283-85, 291. Apparently an example of one
of the more precise protocol price standards would be: "in contracts for
the delivery of goods in 1959 will be preserved, with a consideration of
the quality and technical characteristics of the goods, the prices agreed
upon between . . .organizations in contracts for the delivery of goods
in 1958." Pozdniakov, supra note 14, at 34-35; LUNz, SPECIAL PART, supra
note 2, at 109-10.
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delivery of the import within the current year.1 7 Special agree-
ments for such imports and for other unforeseen problems, such
as delivery defaults, are frequently made.' s
The last of the three types of basic legal documents used in
Comecon foreign trade is a contract for the delivery of specific
goods. This contract is signed by the exporting foreign trade
corporation of one country with the importing foreign trade cor-
poration of the other. For every delivery indicated in the annual
protocol, each country's foreign trade corporation responsible
for that branch of foreign trade signs a contract with the cor-
responding foreign trade corporation of the other country.", The
contract specifies all the matters necessary for the actual de-
livery, such as the quantity, assortment, technical description,
price and date and place of delivery.20 Since these matters are
covered in the protocol only in a more general way, or not at all,
the corporations have some opportunity to use their discretion
and even to engage in hard bargaining with each other, especially
regarding technical specifications, price and delivery dates. The
corporations ultimately deliver and accept goods on the basis of
their contracts.
The foreign trade corporations are independent legal entities
17. See UsENKo, supra note 2, at 285; Pozdniakov, supra note 14,
at 35-36. This same procedure is followed if one side unexpectedly
wants to cancel an import it is scheduled to receive. Most changes dur-
ing the year involve increasing or decreasing the quantity of a scheduled
import. Pozdniakov, supra note 14, at 35-36.
18. Despite all the careful central planning of foreign trade, deliv-
ery defaults and other departures from the trade scheduled in the an-
nual protocols are of significant magnitude in Comecon. G. GAnvw,
MONEY, BANKING, AND CREDIT iN EASTERN EUROPE 106-07 (1966). In the
case of Hungary, for example, it has been estimated that 30% of
Hungary's actual trade with its Comecon trading partners is different
from the planned trade. Shonfield, supra note 5, at 6. But see Katona,
supra note 4, at 234.
19. The contracts, however, are actually often signed during the
months of the year preceding the autumn protocol execution. Foreign
trade between two Comecon countries generally involves some repeti-
tion from year to year of the same basic exports and imports. As a re-
sult, a pair of foreign trade corporations that annually do business with
each other will develop methods enabling them to anticipate orders for
the coming year in advance of the fall protocol signing. Such a pair of
corporations may execute its contract, with the approval of the foreign
trade ministries of both countries, in advance of the protocol's execution;
and the ministries subsequently include the contract delivery in the pro-
tocol. Also, a contract for the delivery of goods requiring several years
preparation has to be concluded in advance of the protocol finally
specifying the delivery during the following year.
20. See UsENKo, supra note 2, at 286; Pozdniakov, supra note 14,
at 34.
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that do not partake of the government's sovereign immunity.
Their contracts create civil law relationships governed by pri-
vate international law. These are the first civil law relation-
ships in the foreign trade process, because prior to the contracts
the only legal documents are the long term agreement and the an-
nual protocol, both of which are signed in the name of sovereign
governments and exist only in the area of public international
law ..2 '
B. FEATURES AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE INTER-GOVERNMENTAL
AGREEMENTS
The distinctive feature of the long term agreements and an-
nual protocols is that the governments determine therein
which goods will be traded in what quantities, and further un-
dertake the obligation "to ensure the delivery of goods" thus
scheduled.2 2  In commercial treaties between governments of
market economy countries, the governments assume no such func-
tions. Rather, their treaties merely provide a legal framework
for possible but generally unspecified trade, the framework
covering matters such as tariffs, export and import licensing,
quotas and exchange control. Within this framework, foreign
trade is then determined as well as conducted by the market
economy enterprises. To be sure, these enterprises are influenced
by the tariffs and other aspects of the inter-governmental frame-
work. Nevertheless, the decisions determining the nature and
quantity of foreign trade are made essentially by the market
economy enterprises.2 3 The market economy governments do not
ensure that there will be a single export or import; they simply
agree to apply the treaty framework to any foreign trade that
the enterprises choose to implement.2 4
21. See generally LUNZ, SPECIAL PART, supra note 2, at 109; Pozd-
niakov, supra note 14, at 34.
22. The exact wording of this obligation is not the same in all of
the agreements and protocols, but the meaning is essentially the same.
RAMZAITSEV, CONTRACT, supra note 4, at 9; UsENKO, supra note 2, at 282-
83, 287-90; Pozdniakov, supra note 14, at 34; Schmitthoff, Commercial
Treaties and International Trade Transactions in East-West Trade, 20
VAND. L. REV. 355, 365 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Schmitthoff, East-
West Trade].
23. Schmitthoff, East-West Trade, supra note 22, at 355-56. Also
the enterprises, through consultations with the governments, may influ-
ence them to adopt a legal framework in the treaties promoting foreign
trade in some goods and inhibiting it in others.
24. See generally id. at 355-56. Thus it is said that these market
economy inter-governmental treaties deal with the public law level of
foreign trade, and that the trade itself is carried on at the separate and
[Vol. 56:1
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In agreements between centrally planned economy countries,
on the other hand, the governments can specify all foreign trade
and ensure the scheduled deliveries.2 5  The Comecon govern-
ments, however, leave the actual trading to the juridically in-
dependent state corporations. The question therefore arises as
to the real meaning of the governmental obligation to ensure
scheduled deliveries.
Evidently it does not mean a legal guarantee that the for-
eign trade corporations will make the scheduled exports,
since Soviet law provides that failure to deliver can occur
without the government's incurring any legal liability. A com-
mon example is a non-delivery due to the fault of the juridically
independent state foreign trade corporation that was to make
the export. Liability rests not with the government on its agree-
ment and protocol obligation, but rather with the corporation.
This liability is civil, and it is based on the corporation's civil
law contract with the other country's importing foreign trade
corporation; it is not based on the agreement or the protocol,
since the exporting corporation is a party to neither.2 0
If the Comecon government's obligation to ensure deliveries
does not consist of a guarantee, of what does it consist? Ap-
parently it consists in part of a duty to issue administrative or-
ders to the country's foreign trade corporations directing them
to conclude contracts with the other country's corporations for
the scheduled trade. Such an order creates for each recipient
corporation a direct domestic administrative law duty to carry
out its part of the scheduled trade.2 7 In addition, in order to ful-
distinct level of private law through the contracts between the market
economy enterprises. Id.
25. These governments also need to specify and to ensure fulfill-
ment of the scheduled foreign trade, since each government has planned
its domestic economy relying in part on realization of this trade, es-
pecially receipt of the scheduled imports. USENKO, supra note 2, at
282-83.
26. Nor, of course, is the importing corporation a party to either.
See generally UsENKo, supra note 2, at 282-83, 287-90; Katona, supra
note 4, at 235-37. Pozdniakov, supra note 14, at 32-38.
27. See UsnrKo, supra note 2, at 288; Katona, supra note 4, at 236-
37. The long term agreement and annual protocols normally indicate
that the scheduled foreign trade will be conducted not by the respective
governments but by their foreign trade corporations. In this connection
an agreement or protocol may provide expressly that each government
will take all necessary measures to ensure that its corporations conclude
the relevant foreign trade contracts. UsENKo, supra note 2, at 286-87;
Katona, supra note 4, at 234-35; Schmitthoff, East-West Trade, supra
note 22, at 363, 365.
In the Soviet Union, the foreign trade corporations are generally
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fill its agreement and protocol obligation, the government evi-
dently must make provision for the scheduled foreign trade in its
national economic planning. This provision requires such
things as scheduling delivery of the raw materials to the export
goods producers, scheduling production of the goods in the na-
tional production plan, scheduling use of the expected imports
in the national consumption plan, scheduling movement of the
goods in the national transportation plan and scheduling the ex-
port and import of the agreed upon goods in the national foreign
trade plan. 28
If one government fails to fulfill its obligation to ensure de-
liveries and causes a default in deliveries by its foreign trade
corporations, what remedy does the other government have?
The long term agreements and annual protocols are regarded by
Soviet jurists as public international law undertakings of sover-
eign independent governments. Therefore, any remedy would
apparently have to take the form of inter-governmental negoti-
ations and of whatever other pressures governments can exert on
each other. 29
C. NATURE OF THE CORPORATIONS' CONTRACTS
In content, a contract between two state foreign trade cor-
porations resembles a foreign trade contract between two market
economy enterprises. There is also a resemblance in a theoretical
sense, since each contract represents the consensus of the contract-
ing parties on the points covered in the contract, even though
Comecon corporations are more restricted in the number of
points they can determine at their own discretion.3"
There exist also two important differences. First, the ori-
gin of a Comecon contract is not a profit oriented decision of
under the administrative jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Trade.
Berman, supra note 4, at 489-90. Therefore, the Soviet Foreign Trade
Minister normally issues the orders directing them to conclude the for-
eign trade contracts. USENKO, supra note 2, at 288. In Hungary, di-
rect administrative orders by the government to the foreign trade cor-
porations in this situation are being replaced by provision by the govern-
ment of financial incentives to the corporations to induce them to enter
into the foreign trade contracts desired by the government. Katona,
supra note 4, at 236-37.
28. See USENKO, supra note 2, at 288-89; Katona, supra note 4, at
237.
29. See generally L. LUNZ, MEZHDUNARODNOE CHASTNOE PRAVO-
OBSHCHAIA CHAST' (PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw-GENERAL PART) 13-15(1959) [hereinafter cited as LUNZ, GENERAL PART]; UsENKo, supra note
2, at 124-32, 282-83, 287-90.
30. Schmitthoff, East-West Trade, supra note 22, at 360.
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each of the foreign trade corporations. Rather, it is a central eco-
nomic planning decision made by the two governments as ex-
pressed in the long term agreement and annual protocol.3 ' Sec-
ond, many of the commercial law provisions of the Comecon
contract, such as the delivery terms or the nature of the seller's
guarantee, are determined not by the foreign trade corporations,
but are prescribed for them by the Comecon General Conditions
for the Delivery of Goods.32
These General Conditions are a multilateral Comecon
agreement unifying much of the international trade law of
member states.33 Applying with the force of law to every con-
tract in Comecon foreign trade, the General Conditions require
certain commercial terms for each such contract.3 4 The General
Conditions were adopted by the Comecon governments to facili-
tate their foreign trade corporations' concluding contracts to im-
plement the inter-governmental annual protocols. The govern-
ments feared that, without such mandatory basic commercial
terms, the corporations would fail to sign some of the con-
tracts envisaged in the annual protocols because of an inability
to agree on the terms.35
Contracting Comecon foreign trade corporations may de-
termine at their discretion matters not covered either in the
31. Current reforms in the domestic economies of the Comecon
countries, however, tend both to shift more elements of the contract de-
cisions from the central governments to the corporations, and also to give
profit factors more weight in the thinking of the central governments
and the corporations alike. This same tendency is beginning to appear in
the foreign trade field.
32. For an extended discussion of these General Conditions, see
Hoya, The Comecon General Conditions-A Socialist Unification of In-
ternational Trade Law, 70 COLUm. L. REv. 253 (1970). For a good
comprehensive treatment of the General Conditions by a leading East
European jurist, published a year after this COLumEIA LAw REVxEv ar-
ticle and discussing many of the issues raised therein, see Katona, supra
note 4, at 242-82. The first General Conditions were implemented
by Comecon in 1958, and a new version was adopted in 1968. For a
translation into English of the 1958 General Conditions, see Berman, Uni-
fication of Contract Clauses in Trade Between Member-Countries of the
Council for Mutual Economic Aid, 7 INT'L & CoiP. L.Q. 659 (1958).
For a translation into English of the 1968 General Conditions, see Hoya
& Quigley, Comecon 1968 General Conditions for the Delivery of Goods,
31 Oino ST. L.J. 1 (1970).
33. Hoya, supra note 32, at 279-300.
34. Id. at 260-68.
35. Id. at 260-62; Katona, supra note 4, at 237-38. Wholly aside
from this mandatory aspect, the General Conditions have significantly
aided contract drafting in Comecon foreign trade simply by providing
the contracting corporations with a reasonably comprehensive unifica-
tion of international trade law. Hoya, supra note 32, at 300-01.
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annual protocol or in the General Conditions. Even where mat-
ters are so covered, the corporations on occasion draft different
provisions in their contract, but such departures from the pro-
tocol or from the General Conditions can create problems. The
General Conditions themselves specify the circumstances under
which there can be a departure from their commercial norms.
An unauthorized departure is without legal effect and the Gen-
eral Conditions' norms are in such a case still controlling.8 0
In the event of a departure from the annual protocol provi-
sion stipulating the delivery of goods that is the subject of the
particular contract, the status of the departure is less clear.'
Such a departure by the contracting corporations is not auto-
matically invalid. Instead, when a provision of the contract de-
parts from a provision of the protocol, the provision that is to con-
trol is apparently determined on a case by case basisY8 So-
viet jurists stress two conflicting values in resolving the issue.
Allowing the protocol provision to control preserves both the
protocol's integrity as a higher source of law and the central
planning embodied in it.3 9 On the other hand, invalidating a
contractual provision to which the two foreign trade corpora-
tions have agreed introduces undesirable uncertainty into their
relations.40  The trend is increasingly to uphold the contractual
provision.
36. Farago, Decisions of the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce in
"Comecon" Arbitrations, 14 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1124-25 (1965); Hoya,
supra note 32, at 264-68. Such a ruling will be made by an arbi-
tration tribunal in a proceeding between the two parties. Farago, supra.
37. The departure may occur especially with respect to the type,
quantity or price of the goods. For example, the protocol may specify
that all goods to be delivered during the coming year are subject to a
frequently used price formula involving the average world market price
over a past several-year period. During the formula years the world
market price for a particular type of goods may, however, have begun a
sharp rise or decline continuing up to the time of the contract signing.
In this situation the corporation benefited by the trend may insist on a
contract price reflecting the trend rather than a price based on the ave-
rage over the formula years. Sometimes the other corporation agrees,
and the contract price then deviates from the protocol's formula.
38. See generally LUNZ, SPECIAL PART, supra note 2, at 109-10.
Apparently the issue arises in the form of an arbitration proceeding
between the two corporations.
39. See generally USENKO, supra note 2, at 284-85.
40. See LUNz, SPECIAL PART, supra note 2, at 109-10. The question
whether the protocol or the contract provision controls is usually re-
solved through arbitration when one corporation seeks to have the con-
tractual provision declared invalid for the reason that it varies from the
protocol. The question may first arise when the foreign trade ministry
of one of the countries refuses to issue the necessary export or import
license unless its corporation obtains revision of the contract to bring it
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Another problem related to the foreign trade corporations'
contracts may occur earlier. After the signing of the annual
protocol, there still exist no civil law relations between the for-
eign trade corporations of the two signing countries. At this
point the only legal obligation of a foreign trade corporation is a
domestic administrative law duty owed to its superior adminis-
trative organ. This organ, following the protocol execution, pre-
sumably has directed the corporation to conclude a contract with
a corporation of the other country for a delivery of goods speci-
fied in the protocol. But neither corporation has any civil law
duty owed to the other corporation. Consequently, if in their
ensuing negotiations the two foreign trade corporations fail to
agree on a contract, neither has any civil law right to conclusion
of a contract that can be enforced against the other. Instead, the
disagreement normally has to be resolved at the level of public
international law by negotiations between the two foreign trade
ministries.4 1
Once a contract between two foreign trade corporations is
signed, however, a civil law relationship is created between
them with reciprocal rights and duties. Any further disputes
are civil law matters that can be resolved at the level of private
international law in foreign trade arbitration tribunals that
operate in each of the Comecon countries. In each Comecon
country, foreign trade civil law litigation is adjudicated not by
the judicial court system, but by a permanent foreign trade ar-
bitration tribunal 42 similar to a specialized state economic court . 3
more into line with the protocol. Or the importing corporation on its
own initiative may resist paying an agreed contract price that is higher
than that provided by the protocol formula, or, having paid, may sue in
arbitration for a refund of the excess payment.
41. See generally Pozdniakov, supra note 14, at 34. This situation
contrasts with that existing domestically in the Soviet Union. There,
after issuance of the annual national economic plan, either of two
Soviet enterprises directed to conclude a contract with each other can
take any pre-contract dispute to state Arbitration for a mandatory solu-
tion. J. HAZARD & I. SHAPiRO, THE Sovmr LEGAL SysTn pt. 2, at 99(1962). In Comecon foreign trade, when two corporations' pre-contract
disagreement concerns price, although neither has the right to bring any
action against the other in any forum, they sometimes voluntarily
agree to refer the matter to an ad hoc commission or to an arbitration
tribunal for resolution. USENKO, supra note 2, at 292-93; Bystricky &
Landa, The Unification of Laws of International Sale, 1959 REv. CON-
TEMP. L. No. 1, 67, 81; Katona, supra note 4, at 239-42.
42. See Hoya, supra note 32, at 278-79.
43. S. PISAR, COEXISTENCE AM CoMMnUMcE 391-98 (1970); Pisar,
The Communist System of Foreign-Trade Adjudication, 72 HARv. L.
Ray. 1409, 1458-67 (1959).
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D. THE Two LEGAL LEVELS OF FOREIGN TRADE
Comecon foreign trade is thus conducted, at least in legal
terms, on two levels: public international law, through the gov-
ernments' long term agreements and annual protocols; and civil
law relations and private international law, through the state
foreign trade corporations' contracts. Is there really any dif-
ference between these two legal levels? This question natu-
rally presents itself in view of the state monopoly of foreign
trade existing in each Comecon country.
The difference between the two legal levels might seem
merely nominal. In the Soviet Union, for example, the Ministry
of Foreign Trade, which generally negotiates and signs the agree-
ments and protocols for the government, also exercises direct
administrative supervision over most of the Soviet foreign trade
corporations. On the other hand, the distinction between the two
legal levels is clear in theory, and is carefully maintained in So-
viet literature on the subject.4 4 Also, the inter-governmental
agreements and protocols certainly exist in practice as an in-
dependent level of public international law.
What is not clear is how separate, in practice, from the pub-
lic international law level is the civil law level of the foreign
trade corporations' contracts. Whether these contracts operate
on a meaningfully independent level of law has proved a trou-
blesome question in the practice of Comecon foreign trade.
As already indicated, two foreign trade corporations have
some latitude in negotiating the terms of a contract for a delivery
scheduled in the annual protocol between their two countries, and
they have no civil law rights and duties running between them
until they execute their contract. 45 What is significant, how-
ever, is the level at which these rights and duties are enforced.
This question comes to a head in the common situation of a de-
livery default by a foreign trade corporation. The exporting
corporation in default owes a civil law duty to the importing for-
eign trade corporation of the other country on the basis of their
contract. The resulting liability could be resolved at either the
44. See generally LUNZ, SPECIAL PART, supra note 2, at 107-11; USEN-
KO, supra note 2, at 124-32; Boguslavsky, Pravovye Formy Obespecheniia
Mezhgosudarstvennoi Spetsializatsii i Kooperirovaniia Proizvodstva
Stran-Chlenov SEV (The Legal Forms of Backing Interstate Specializa-
tion and Coordination of Production of CMEA Countries) 1966 SOVWTSKOE
GOSUDARSTVO I PRAvo No. 8, at 3, 10-11 [translation of title stated in the
periodical].
45. See text accompanying notes 19-20 and 41-43 supra.
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civil law or at the public international law level. That is, it
could be resolved by the corporations according to the civil law
rules existing in the Comecon countries, or by the foreign trade
ministries through the inter-governmental protocols.
Following a calendar year, the foreign trade ministries of
two Comecon countries normally meet to determine which of
the goods scheduled for delivery during that year by the annual
protocol were in fact delivered and which were not. The results
of this determination are usually reflected in a special protocol
executed by the two foreign trade ministries. For any goods
scheduled but not delivered, this special protocol often cancels
the delivery provision in the expired year's annual protocol and,
if the delivery is still desired, includes it in the annual protocol
for the year just beginning.46
The question thereby raised is the effect of this special pro-
tocol cancellation and partial rescheduling of deliveries on the
civil law liability of a foreign trade corporation that has defaulted
on a scheduled delivery during the year just concluded. The
answer depends on how independent the contracts of the foreign
trade corporations are from the protocols of the foreign trade
ministries. At one extreme, the contracts could be viewed as
merely subordinate adjuncts of the protocols. Then a cancella-
tion of the concluded year's protocol provision on which the de-
faulted delivery contract had been based would automatically
cancel the civil law liability of the defaulting corporation for not
having made the now cancelled delivery. At the opposite ex-
treme, the corporations' contracts could be deemed to represent
a genuinely distinct level of foreign trade. Then a defaulting
corporation's civil law liability should ordinarily remain unaf-
fected by any protocol adjustment made after the corporation
had signed its contract.
• In actual practice Comecon foreign trade has moved from
the first answer to the second.47 In the 1950's, when the Come-
con economies were still recovering from the war, the main
trade objective was to exchange at least enough goods so that
each country was provided with the basic minimum its economy
had to import. Hence delivery defaults were usually resolved
through the protocols, because they focus directly on the physical
flow of trade. By the 1960's, however, the Comecon economies
46. See generally Katona, supra note 4, at 234.
47. Comecon foreign trade practice has not, however, always de-
scribed these answers in terms of the independence of the contracts
from the protocols.
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had improved to the point where the desired minimum trade flow
was reasonably assured, so the primary concern became not so
much achieving this minimum flow as achieving it efficiently.
Consequently, delivery defaults came to be resolved more through
the civil law rules, which determine the corporation responsible
for the default and require it to compensate the injured corpora-
tion.
As long as achieving a minimum trade flow was the major
concern, resolving delivery defaults through the protocols had
an evident attractiveness. What appeared paramount, especially
to the foreign trade ministries, was to decide which of the
prior year's unfulfilled deliveries were still desired, to arrange
fulfillment of those deliveries during the year just beginning
and to forget the unfulfilled deliveries no longer wanted. Any
determination of civil law liability of corporations in default on
deliveries probably seemed unimportant.
Indeed, for the foreign trade ministries or the corporations to
take the time and energy in the case of each default on delivery
to make a precise determination of civil law liability probably
seemed wastefully legalistic. It doubtless appeared that such ef-
fort would be more fruitfully used in solving the physical produc-
tion problem. At the exporting corporation the economic diffi-
culty that caused the delivery default needed curing, and at the
importing corporation the nondelivered goods had to be obtained
from some other source or done without, either permanently or
until a rescheduled delivery could be obtained from the original
exporter. To focus instead on determining the liability in every
case under civil law rules by each corporation's insisting on its
strict legal rights against the other in the manner of plaintiff and
defendant would have seemed an undesirably antagonistic adver-
sary approach. Socialist internationalism might seem instead to
require a mutually helpful joint effort at problem solving by the
parties involved.48
Concentrating only on the physical volume of trade, however,
led to neglecting the efficiency with which this volume was at-
tained. Therefore, once the Comecon countries had a minimum
trade flow that was reasonably secure, they turned their atten-
tion to the efficiency problem. To stimulate the foreign trade
corporations to greater efficiency, the corporations' performance
48. This opposition to an adversary approach in resolving delivery
defaults is similar to the thinking that prevailed in the Soviet Union in
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came to be judged not only on the physical volume of their trade,
but also on their profitability. So that their profitability would
be determined accurately, it became necessary in delivery de-
faults to require the corporation at fault to compensate the in-
jured corporation. For this purpose, resolution of delivery de-
faults by the foreign trade corporations under the civil law rules
of liability was clearly more effective than resolution by the for-
eign trade ministries through the special protocols summing up
the past year's results.
The special protocols usually did not address themselves
to the liability issue, but usually just canceled defaulted deliveries
and rescheduled deliveries still desired. Also, as long as a for-
eign trade corporation was judged primarily on fulfillment of phy-
sical trade targets, it had little incentive to press a monetary
claim even when another foreign trade corporation had defaulted
on a delivery to it. When a foreign trade corporation did sue in
arbitration on a default, the arbitration tribunal often held
that the cancellation by the special protocol of the past year's pro-
tocol provision for that delivery canceled as well the defaulting
corporation's liability for the nondelivery.49
State Arbitration in the early 1930s. See J. HAzAn & L SHAPmo, supra
note 41, at 98-99.
49. Some arbitration decisions held that the defaulting corporation
was excused from civil liability beginning with the effective date of
the special protocol cancelling the delivery provision in the expired
year's annual protocol That way the corporation was liable at least for
its non-delivery from the contract delivery date up to the special proto-
col's effective date. Other decisions, however, excused the defaulting
corporation from all liability before the special protocors effective
date as well. Sometimes the special protocols would state expressly
whether a cancellation was made as of the effective date of the special
protocol or as of the date of the foreign trade corporations' contract.
Katona, supra note 4, at 269.
For a discussion of the arbitral decisions generally, see Luirz, SPECIAL
PART, supra note 2, at 110-11; S. PISAR, CoEXIsTENCE AND CoMmiERCE 290-
93 (1970); Kojouharoff, Chronique de Jurisprudence de la Cour arbitrale
pres la Chambre de commerce bulgare (Journal of Proceedings of the
Arbitration Court of the Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce), 94 JOURNAL
Du Dnorr INTERNATIONAL 152, 180-84 (1967); RAMzArrsEV, CONTRACT, supra
note 4, at 9-11; Fargo, Zu einigen Entscheidungen des Schiedsgerichts
der Ungarischen Handelskammer (Several Decisions of the Arbitration
Court of the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce), RBcar mi AussErANr.
No. 1, at 4 (1961) (published as a supplement to DER AussNnr LM
No. 2 (1961)); Genkin, 0 Rabote Vneshnetorgovoi Arbitrazhnoi Komis-
sii pri Vsesoiuznoi Torgovoi Palate za 1957-59 gg. (On the Work of the
Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission of the All-Union Chamber of
Commerce for the years 1957-59) [hereinafter cited as Genkin, Arbi-
tration] in 11 SEsxsA PRAVA VsEsoruzNoi TORGOVOI PALATY (SECTION
OF LAw OF THE ALL-UNION CHAMBER OF COMMERCE), SBoRNIc INFORMAT-
SIONNYKU MATERIALOV (COLLECTION OF INFORMA77ONAL MATkerALS) 3,
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Once the foreign trade corporations came to be judged in part
on the profitability of their operation, however, they became
more interested in pressing civil law claims in an adversary man-
ner when the other party to their contracts defaulted. The de-
faulting corporation could pay voluntarily the claimed civil law
penalty or damages or both to the injured corporation or, in the
event of dispute, the matter could be decided by an arbitration
tribunal. The tribunals came to award penalties and damages ac-
cording to whether the defaulting corporation was at fault under
the relevant civil law rules. The foreign trade ministries gen-
erally continued to make their special protocol cancelations
and reschedulings for delivery defaults. But the arbitration
tribunals gradually came to hold that these protocol adjustments
had no effect on the arbitral determination, under civil law
rules, of whether the defaulting corporation had to compensate
the injured corporation.50 This resolution of delivery defaults
entirely according to civil law rules began to provide an incen-
tive for the corporations to fulfill their contractual obligations
promptly.
In the Soviet Union, for example, foreign trade corporations,
like state economic enterprises generally, operate according to
economic accountability (khozrasch~t). By this principle, each
corporation, as an independent legal entity, is responsible only
for its own obligations. It is not responsible for the obligations
of the state or of any other state organization, and neither the
state nor any other state organization answers for the corpora-
tion's obligations.5 1 Each corporation maintains a record of its
9-10 (1961) [complete work hereinafter cited as COLLECTION]; Pozdnia-
kov, supra note 14, at 36-38; Ramzaitsev, Deiatel'nost' Vneshnetorgovoi
Arbitrazhnoi Komissii v Moskve v 1957 g. (Activity of the Foreign Trade
Arbitration Commission in 1957) [translation of the title stated in the
publication], in SOVETSKII EZHEGODNIK MEZHDUNARODNOVO PRAVA-1958
(SOVIET YEAR-BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW-1958) at 463, 465-66 (1959)
[translation of title stated in the publication]; Szaszy, supra note 3, at
426.
50. See generally the authorities for arbitral decisions cited in note
49 supra.
51. S. PISAR, COEXISTENCE AND COMMERCE 262-68 (1970); Grzybow-
ski, supra note 4, at 191-94; Lunz, Conflict of Laws in International Sale:
Theory and Practice of Socialist Countries, 114 RECUEIL DES COURs 1, 45-
47 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Lunz, Conflicts]; Pisar, Soviet Conflict
of Laws in International Commercial Transactions, 70 HARV. L. REV. 593,
642-45 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Pisar, Soviet Conflicts]. The legally
separate personality of Soviet state economic enterprises is illustrated
by two Soviet arbitration cases involving Soviet contacts with non-
Comecon countries. In In re the Motorship "King Edgar" (1932), VsEso-
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individual costs and receipts, and the corporation's profit or loss
as reflected in a comparison of its costs and receipts is one
measure of its performance. Whether there is a profit, and
the amount of the profit, influence the income and advancement
of the corporation's personnel. 52 Thus economic accountability
promotes efficient performance. The principle operates simi-
larly in the other Comecon countries.53
Therefore, within Comecon it is increasingly recognized as
desirable to hold a foreign trade corporation defaulting on a de-
livery to its full liability according to civil law rules. Excusing
any part of this liability because of a protocol adjustment un-
IUZNAIA TORGOVAIA PALATA (ALL UNION CHAIBER OF COMMERCE), SBOR-
N R F . Mop. fARB. KoM. (COLLECTION OF DECISIONS OF THE MARIME
ARBrrTATioN COIvnvrsSION) 9 (1934), the plaintiff Soviet merchant fleet
corporation sued the defendants, British owners of the ship "King
Edgar," for compensation for assistance rendered the ship while it was
aground in Soviet territorial waters. Defendants pleaded negligence of
plaintiff, the buoys in the Soviet territorial waters allegedly having been
misleadingly placed. The Soviet Maritime Arbitration Commission re-jected this defense as irrelevant Supervision of the buoys was the
responsibility not of plaintiff but of the Soviet People's Commissariat
for War and Maritime Affairs, the Commission said, and plaintiff as an
independent legal entity did not answer for acts or omissions of the
Soviet state or of other state organizations. See also LuNz, GENERAL
PART, supra note 29, at 164-66; S. PISAR, COEXIsNCE AND Cormn'msncE 267
(1970); Lunz, Conflicts, supra at 46; Pisar, Soviet Conflicts, supra, at
644-45.
In Jordan Investment Ltd. (Israeli corporation) v. VIO Soiuz-
nefteksport (Soviet corporation) (1958), reported in Domke, The Israeli-
Soviet Oil Arbitration, 53 AM. J. IN'L L. 787 (1959), after the 1956
Israeli-Egyptian war had broken out, the Soviet Foreign Trade Ministry
had refused to grant an export license to defendant Soviet seller to
deliver oil to plaintiff Israeli buyer on a contract made before the war.
In plaintiffs subsequent suit for damages for nonperformance, defendant
pleaded force majeure. Plaintiff argued, inter alia, that the connection
between defendant and the Soviet Foreign Trade Ministry was so
close that the latter's denial of the export license could not qualify as a
supervening impossibility under the force majeure clause of the contract.
The Soviet Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission rejected this argu-
ment of plaintiff by confirming defendant's status as an independent ju-
dicial entity separate from the state and from other state organizations.
See also Berman, supra note 4, at 494 n.35; Lunz, Conflicts, supra, at
46-47.
For a discussion by a Hungarian jurist of the status of the Comecon
countries' state foreign trade corporations as independent legal entities,
see F. MADL, FOREIGN TRADE MONOPOLY-PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
41-45 (1967).
52. See generally J. HAzARD & L Smkpmo, supra note 41, at 80-81;
RAmzAirsEv, CoNTRACT, supra note 4, at 17-21; S. PISAm, COrxISTE CE AND
COMVIERCE 265-66 (1970); Berman, supra note 4, at 487-88; Pisar, Soviet
Conflicts, supra note 51, at 642-45.
53. Grzybowski, supra note 4, at 190-95; Katona, supra note 4, at
227.
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dermines economic accountability; determining and enforcing
the liability strictly according to the civil law supports it. In
simplest terms, a foreign trade corporation that functions poorly
is now repeatedly required to pay a penalty and damages and
to render specific performance, while a well run corporation is
relatively free of such liability and, when appropriate, receives
the benefit of collecting such payments. In this way the finan-
cial statements of each corporation reflect the quality of its
management and personnel. To the management and person-
nel of the corporation with good financial statements go larger
bonuses and career advancement. Experience has shown that
this economic accountability stimulates corporate efficiency with-
out damaging socialist internationalism.
Thus the civil law contracts of the foreign trade corporations
are becoming a level of law meaningfully independent of the
inter-governmental agreements and protocols at the public in-
ternational law level. When a corporation has defaulted on a
delivery, using the protocol adjustment to excuse a defaulting
corporation's civil law liability has advantages-simplicity, speed
and an appearance of selfless cooperation-but it disrupts eco-
nomic accountability. 54  And economic accountability, the key
to efficient performance by the corporations, is now seen as the
higher value.
54. An additional problem when the liability of a foreign trade
corporation in default is excused on the basis of a protocol adjustment is
the disturbance of economic accountability within the countries of the
exporting and importing foreign trade corporations. Thus the importing
corporation is normally a middleman trading corporation and has a con-
tract to sell the imported goods to an operating domestic enterprise
(see note 4 supra). Unless the importing foreign trade corporation can
obtain the goods from some other foreign source, it will be forced to de-
fault on its domestic contract. By thus defaulting it incurs a civil lia-
bility to the domestic enterprise. But it cannot fairly be required to
pay this liability because it has not collected compensation from the
defaulting exporting corporation of the other country. Consequently, by
law or by administrative order, the domestic civil liability of the im-
porting foreign trade corporation has to be cancelled. But the domestic
enterprise that expected the imported goods from the importing corpora-
tion may in turn be forced to default on a domestic contract with a
second domestic enterprise to whom the imported goods were to be sold
after processing by the first domestic enterprise. Since this first enter-
prise was prevented from collecting compensation from the importing
corporation, out of fairness this enterprise must be excused from civil
law liability for its default to the second enterprise. The second enter-
prise may in turn incur a civil law liability to a third enterprise that
has to be excused, so that the liability adjustment process may involve
several enterprises and become quite complex before it is finally set-
tled.
A similar chain reaction can take place in the country of the ex-
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When economic accountability is allowed to operate prop-
erly, the situation bears some similarity to that in a market
economy. In the usual large market economy corporation control
is separated from ownership, and corporate management is re-
warded (at least in theory) in significant measure on the basis of
the corporation's financial performance. The concept of eco-
nomic accountability is an attempt to utilize this market economy
incentive method within the confines of a centrally planned
economy. That a Comecon economy is centrally planned means,
of course, that the management of a foreign trade corporation has
far less authority to exercise and to be held accountable for
than the management of a market economy corporation.
In general, the purpose of the Comecon foreign trade legal
structure is to distribute goods in foreign trade according to a
bilaterally determined inter-governmental plan.55 To realize
this goal, the Comecon legal system works on two levels. At
the public international law level, the system assigns to the cen-
tral governments an active role in determining and fulfilling trade
commitments. In market economies, at this level, the govern-
ments only provide a framework within which any trade is de-
termined and fulfilled by the market economy enterprises.
At the private international law level, on the other hand, the
Comecon legal system increasingly seeks efficient performance
through economic accountability by providing and enforcing ci-
vil law rights and duties for the contracting parties. Comecon
foreign trade corporations are thereby led to view fulfillment
of contractual obligations much as do market economy enter-
prises. These enterprises, of course, because they decide what
contractual obligations they will undertake, not only implement
but also determine trade in the market economy system.
IIr ANGLO-SOVIET TRADE
The differences between the foreign trade legal structures
of centrally planned economies and of market economies have al-
ready been described. What then is the structure of trade be-
porting foreign trade corporation that defaulted. Thus this exporting
corporation, although it was excused from compensating the importing
corporation, may have a civil law right within its own country to
collect compensation from a domestic enterprise that failed to supply it
with the goods to be exported. Out of fairness this supplier's liability
has to be canceled, and so on back down the economic process of pre-
paring the goods for export.
55. See K. GRmZYowsK, THE SOCIALIST COMMONWEALTH OF NATioNs
63 (1964).
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tween a country of each type, as in Anglo-Soviet trade? The
answer, as supplied by the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreements
of 1959, 1964 and 1969,56 is that this East-West trader' uses pri-
marily the market economy trade legal structure.5 Thus, each
of these Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreements does not determine what
amount of trade in which types of goods will take place, nor does
it place upon either government any obligation to ensure any
deliveries. Rather, the Agreement simply provides a legal frame-
work within which British firms and Soviet foreign trade cor-
porations can trade if they conclude contracts. The framework
is designed merely to facilitate such trade. 59
In general, this framework consists of two parts. One part,
covering a wide range of goods, contains no quantity limits of
any kind. Thus, for example, Soviet goods entering Britain un-
der this part of the Agreement do not require an import license.
Neither government has any affirmative obligation under this
part of the Agreement, and the volume of trade in goods to which
it applies is set by whatever the British firms and Soviet corpora-
tions agree to sell to each other. Over 90% of Anglo-Soviet trade
takes place under this part of the Agreement. British exports here
consist mostly of capital goods and manufactured materials.
A second part of the framework applies to consumer and
certain other goods. Under the authority of the Agreement the
two governments establish annual maximum quotas for these
goods. Trade in these goods amounts to less than 10% of total
Anglo-Soviet trade. After the quotas have been set, apparently
each government has the obligation to satisfy applications for any
necessary import licenses up to the agreed quotas; but there will
56. Five Year Trade Agreement between Great Britain and the
U.S.S.R., May 24, 1959, [1960] Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 34 (CMND. 1076), 374
U.N.T.S .305. In 1964 this Agreement was prolonged for a second five
year period. April 23, 1964. [1965] Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 13 (CMND. 2557),
539 U.N.T.S. 360. In 1969 the Long Term Trade Agreement between
Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. was signed. June 3, 1969, (CMND. 4091), 8
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1301 (1969).
57. This article discusses only Anglo-Soviet trade as an instance of
market economy-centrally planned economy trade. Other instances of
trade between countries of each type may use a legal structure differ-
ent from that of the Anglo-Soviet model.
In countries with market economies, the government does, of course,
play a role in the economy. The nature and extent of this role varies
among the Western industrialized countries. The roles of the British
and American governments are more similar to each other in this re-
spect than either is to the role of the government in most of the other
Western industrialized countries.
58. See Schmitthoff, East-West Trade, supra note 22, at 366-68.
59. See id.
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in fact be trade in these goods subject to quotas only if the British
firms and Soviet corporations actually contract for such trade.
With regard to the practical operation of the quotas, the govern-
ments have often arranged authorization for imports into the
Soviet Union in excess of the annual quotas and occasionally for
such excess imports into Britain.6 9
The Agreements resemble the Comecon system in that each
is for a set number of years-the 1959 and 1964 Agreements for
five years and the 1969 Agreement for six and one-half.0 ' Each
Agreement also provides for representatives of both countries to
meet at least annually to review trade operations under the
Agreement. But in sum, the substance of the Anglo-Soviet Trade
Agreement-a framework within which actual trade is deter-
mined by the British firms and Soviet corporations-is no dif-
ferent from the commercial treaties used between market econ-
omy countries. Those aspects of the Agreement resembling the
Comecon system-the set number of years each Agreement runs
and the annual review of the Agreement's operation-relate es-
sentially only to form. -6 2
A. MosT-FAvoRED-NATIoN TREATMENw
A crucial element of Anglo-Soviet trade is most-favored-na-
tion treatment (MFN) which each side substantially accords to
the other. iFN is not mentioned in the 1959, 1964 or 1969 An-
glo-Soviet Trade Agreement, but is granted reciprocally in a
60. For those years under the Agreement prior to 1970, annual
quotas were established for imports both into the Soviet Union and
into Britain, but beginning with 1970, annual quotas were established
only for imports into Britain. Less than 5% of the 1970 imports into
Britain were goods coming within the quota provisions of the Agree-
ment. The Soviet government can, of course, effectively regulate ir-
ports into the Soviet Union simply through its administrative control of
the import purchasing of the Soviet foreign trade corporations.
61. The 1969 Agreement runs from July 1, 1969, until December 31,
1975, and thus, unlike the 1959 and 1964 Agreements, has an ending date
that coincides with the ending of a Soviet five-year plan. After 1975,
the 1969 Agreement will be automatically extended annually unless ei-
ther government gives the prescribed notice of termination.
62. Schmitthoff, East-West Trade, supra note 22, at 367-68. In post-
World War H1 communications regarding possibly expanded American-
Soviet trade, the Soviet government has suggested to the American gov-
ernment an undertaking beyond the normal range of market economy
government activity. It has requested some American government as-
surance that American labor unions and other organizations would not
discriminate against American-Soviet trade. The American government
has replied that it lacks legal authority to give such an assurance.
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1934 Anglo-Soviet agreement.0 3 There is a question, however,
whether this 1934 agreement is still in force, so that the present
reciprocal granting of MFN may be a matter of unilateral discre-
tion on each side rather than of treaty obligation.
Between market economy countries, MFN is the very foun-
dation of commercial treaties.6 4 There is no one universally ac-
cepted formulation of MFN. Traditionally, however, granting
MFN to another country has meant according products of that
country terms of trade no less favorable than those accorded by
the granting country to like products of the most favored third
country with which the granting country trades. MFN's primary
focus has historically been on tariffs on imported goods. Other
matters may also come within the focus of MFN, such as quanti-
tive and other restrictions and charges on exports to as well as
on imports from the country receiving MFN. In addition, MFN
clauses may be interpreted or drafted to apply to the rights of
nationals and companies of the country receiving MFN to enter
the country granting MFN to exhibit their products, ship the prod-
ucts in their own vessels and have access to its judicial and ar-
bitration tribunals. In general MFN is intended to minimize gov-
ernmental interference with the market forces that motivate for-
eign trade between market economies.05
Since World War II the Soviet Union with its centrally
planned economy has normally obtained reciprocal MFN in its
trade agreements with market economy countries. 0 MFN is
a problem in trade between a centrally planned and a market
economy country, however, because only the Soviet foreign trade
corporations receive the important MFN benefits of a reasonably
competitive opportunity to sell exports in the other country.
For the market economy country's exporters, receipt of MFN
63. Anglo-Soviet Commercial Agreement, Feb. 16, 1934, [1934]
Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 11 (CMD. 4567), 149 L.N.T.S. 445.
64. See Schmitthoff, East-West Trade, supra note 22, at 355-58. But
see Dale, Principles of Favored Nation Laid to Rest, N.Y. Times, May
30, 1971, § 3, at 7, cols. 4-7.
65. J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT § 11.3 (1969);
S. PISAR, COEXISTENCE AND COMMERCE 196 (1970); Domke & Hazard, State
Trading and the Most-Favored-Nation Clause, 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 55-56
(1958); Hazard, Commercial Discrimination and International Law, 52
AM. J. INT'L L. 495, 497-98 (1958); Schmitthoff, East-West Trade, supra
note 22, at 355-58.
66. The Soviet Union had 28 trade agreements with market econ-
omy countries of the West and of Asia, all apparently granting the
Soviet Union some form of MFN, as of December 31, 1956. Domke &
Hazard, supra note 65, at 61-62; THE CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE GENERAL
AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1956 236 (1957).
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in the Soviet state trading system lacks significant meaning.
For example, with regard to tariffs-historically the primary
subject of YIFN6 7-the Soviet central government, which deter-
mines Soviet import purchasing, essentially both pays the tariffs
through the importing foreign trade corporations and simul-
taneously collects them through the receiving state treasury.0 8
Other aspects of foreign trade regulation within the purview
of 1VIFN are often handled in the Soviet system at the administra-
tive level, where any discriminatory practice may be difficult
for the market economy exporter to prove.0
For these reasons, market economy countries have directed
attention to what they might obtain as a reasonable quid pro
quo for giving the Soviet Union MFN. One solution, tried mainly
before World War II, is a commitment by the Soviet government
to import annually a specified quantity of goods from the market
economy country.7° In the postwar period the Soviet govern-
67. Domke & Hazard, supra note 65, at 55.
68. Consequently, when a market economy country's exports be-
come saleable in the Soviet Union at a lower price because MFN has
reduced import duties, they do not thereby become any more attractive
for Soviet purchase. The gain from the lowered price to the Soviet
government ultimately financing the purchase is exactly offset by the
loss to the government from the reduced tariff collection. By contrast,
in Britain or the United States, Soviet exports becoming saleable at a
lower price by virtue of MFN's reducing the applicable British or
American tariff do become more attractive for purchase. The market
economy enterprises making the purchases benefit fully from the lowered
price because these enterprises have no connection with the governmen-
tal tariff collections.
MFN clauses appear in the bilateral trade and navigation treaties
between the Comecon countries, but MFN would not seem to have much
significance in the trade between centrally planned economies. See
UssExo, supra note 2, at 226-51.
69. See S. PismA, COEXsTECCE AND CoINZMaCE 207 (1970); Pisar,
Soviet Conflicts, supra note 51, at 646-47.
70. Domke & Hazard, supra note 65, at 56-58. American-Soviet
trade agreements were concluded on this basis in 1935 and 1937. Com-
mercial Relations Agreement with the U.S.S.R., July 13, 1935, 49 Stat.
3805 (1935-36), E.A.S. No. 81; Commercial Relations Agreement with
the U.S.S.R., Aug. 4, 1937, 50 Stat. 1619 (1937), E.A.S. No. 105. The 1937
agreement was subsequently extended for one year periods: Aug. 5,
1938, 53 Stat. 1947 (1939), E.A.S. No. 132; Aug. 2, 1939, 53 Stat. 2404
(1939), E.A.S. No. 151; Aug. 6, 1940, 54 Stat. 2366 (1939-1941), E.A.S.
No. 179; Aug. 2, 1941, 55 Stat. 1316 (1941-1942), E.A.S. No. 215; July 31,
1942, 56 Stat. 1575 (1942), E.A.S. No. 265. Berman & Garson, Possible
Effects of the Proposed East-West Trade Relations Act Upon U.S. Import,
and Credit Controls, 20 VAND. L. Rav. 279, 281 (1967); Domke & Hazard,
supra note 65, at 57-58. The Anglo-Soviet Commercial Agreement Feb.
16, 1934, [1934] Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 11 (Cim. 4567), 149 L.N.T.S. 445, was
also signed on this Soviet minimum purchase commitment basis.
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ment generally has refused to undertake such a purchase com-
mitment unless the market economy government does likewise,
which the latter cannot because it is powerless to commit its
importers.7 1 Another attempted solution is the "commercial con-
siderations" clause, by which a centrally planned economy
country promises to determine its foreign trade solely on the
basis of commercial and financial considerations. 72  Market econ-
omy country experience with this clause, however, has been
unsatisfactory because there is no reliable way of knowing
whether the centrally planned economy country is actually abid-
ing by it.73
More recently, Poland proposed a new formula in connection
with its application for membership in the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Poland offered to include in its
central plans a foreign trade quota corresponding to a certain
proportion of growth in its domestic market and to use the in-
creased export revenue earned through receiving MFN in market
economy countries to pay for increased imports.7' Poland was
finally accepted as a GATT member in 1967 under an arrangement
whereby Poland promised to buy from all the other GATT
countries together a total of goods each year equal to the total
of such purchases by Poland during the previous year plus a seven
percent increase at minimum.7 5 Various other solutions to the
71. Even were the Soviet Union alone to undertake a purchase com-
mitment, the resulting system of bilateralism would not be as consistent
with the principle of comparative advantage as the multilateral trade
system sought by market economy countries through the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The draftsmen of the proposed
International Trade Organization Charter following World War II tried
to resolve this problem. They attempted to frame some annual global
purchase commitment that would be undertaken by all centrally planned
economy countries together for all their purchases from all market
economy countries in return for the centrally planned economy coun-
tries' receiving MFN for their exports. This attempt, however, failed
in the drafting stage. Domke & Hazard, supra note 65, at 59-60.
72. Such a clause was inserted in the Anglo-Soviet Commercial
Agreements, April 16, 1930, [1930] Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 19, (CMD. 3552), 101
L.N.T.S. 409, and Feb. 16, 1934, [1934] Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 11 (CMD.
4567), 149 L.N.T.S. 445, in the Draft Charter of the International Trade
Organization, which was not adopted because of insufficient ratifications
and in GATT, which was signed in 1947. Domke & Hazard, supra note
65, at 58-60.
73. Domke & Hazard, supra note 65, at 67-68.
74. COmmTTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, EAST-WEST TRADE
24 (1965).
75. J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAw OF GATT § 14.9
(1969). On February 5, 1971, Poland's arrangement with GATT was
revised so that, in general terms, the seven percent annual increase may
now be calculated by averaging the actual increase over a several-year
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MFN problem have been proposed.-6
Evidently the current British solution is to consider its grant-
ing of MFN to the Soviet Union to be a matter of unilateral dis-
cretion. Thus the British government can withdraw the MFN
any time it believes British exporters are not receiving fair con-
sideration from the Soviet side." Similarly, in the United
States the Johnson Administration's proposed "East-West Trade
Relations Act" would not have directly granted MEN to Com-
munist countries by statute for an indefinite period, as is done
for non-Communist countries. Instead, the proposed Act would
have empowered the President to conclude commercial agree-
ments with individual Communist countries granting them MEN
for a period of up to three years,7 8 such agreements being "subject
to suspension or termination at any time upon reasonable no-
period. The GATT arrangement with Poland is, of course, a variation
of the purchase commitment given by the Soviet Union before World
War 1 in bilateral trade agreements. Poland is the only completely cen-
trally planned economy to have applied for and gained membership in
GATT. Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia are also members of GATT, but
Czechoslovakia became a member in 1947 before it was a centrally
planned economy, and Yugoslavia, which applied in 1958 and became a
member in 1965, demonstrated to GATT that it had adopted many mar-
ket economy principles. Currently Rumania and Hungary, which
have observer status in GATT, have applied for membership. Bulgaria,
which also has observer status, is thought to be considering applying for
membership. S. PsAa, CoExrsTENcE AND COMMERCE 176-79 (1970).
76. It has been suggested, for example, that a centrally planned
economy country, in return for receiving MiFN, could agree to particular
prices at which certain market economy exports could be sold in the
centrally planned economy country's domestic market. The prices
would be those at which the centrally planned economy country itself
could produce and sell comparable goods, as determined by cost studies.
The centrally planned economy country would then allow as much or
as many of each of the designated kinds of market economy exports
to be sold as its domestic market would buy. This system might be
especially suitable for consumer goods.
One long range possibility is the centrally planned economy coun-
try's granting more authority to its foreign trade corporations to deter-
mine whether to buy certain imports and from which countries. If
these foreign trade corporations functioned on the basis of economic ac-
countability and received no benefit on their books for the governments
tariff collections, AFN for the tariffs of the centrally planned economy
country might assume some significance. See notes 124-25 and accom-
panying text infra.
77. For the experience of market economy countries with a termina-
ble MdFN coupled with a purchase commitment, see Domke & Hazard,
supra note 65, at 57, 60, 63.
78. East-West Trade Relations Act of 1966, § 5 (a). This proposed
Act was published in 54 Dm'T STATE BULL. No. 1405, 838, 843-44 (May
30, 1966), and in Dep't of State, The Battle Act Report 1966, 19th Rep.
to Congress 36. It was not enacted into law by Congress.
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tice. '' 79 rn addition, the proposed Act suggested provisions in
such agreements assuring American parties fair treatment in
specific matters of importance, such as protection of industrial
rights and processes, arrangements for the settlement of commer-
cial disputes, establishment of trade and tourist promotion fa-
cilities and the application of duties and other restrictions on
imports from the United States.80
B. UNILATERAL TRADE MEASURES
In Anglo-Soviet trade, each government, of course, applies
certain trade measures independent of any bilateral commit-
ments to the other. The Soviet government completely controls
what its foreign trade corporations import and export simply
through its administration of the state monopoly of foreign
trade. The British government, in turn, exerts some influence on
exporting by British firms mainly through: prohibiting the ex-
port of certain goods;s requiring for some others an export li-
cense that is granted only if certain conditions are satisfied;
79. East-West Trade Relations Act of 1966, § 5(b). The pro-
posed Act would have instructed the President to suspend or terminate
an agreement upon determining that the Communist country was "no
longer fulfilling its obligations under the agreement" (§ 6(b) (1) )
or that suspension or termination was "in the national interest" (§
6 (b) (2) ). For a criticism of the three-year term and these additional
provisions regarding the period of the MFN grant as "creating this sec-
ond-class kind of most-favored-nation treatment," see Berman & Garson,
The Road to Trade, THE NATION, May 15, 1967, at 626, 628.
80. East-West Trade Relations Act of 1966, § 4. Specifically
spelling out the desired fair treatment on particular matters, as opposed
to generalized phrasing, would enable the agreement to serve more read-
ily as the basis for a diplomatic protest should some situation require
it. Hazard, supra note 65, at 498; Berman & Garson, supra note 70, at
281-82.
Basically, of course, the theoretical problem of a reciprocal grant of
MFN with the Soviet Union lies in assuring American exporters a
reasonable chance to sell to the Soviet Union. As a practical matter,
however, economic reality suggests that, in the event of expanded
American-Soviet trade, the Soviet Union may be interested in buy-
ing more American goods than the volume of Soviet goods it will be able
to sell on the competitive American market. Therefore, there may be
little danger that the United States would run a deficit in the bilateral
trade.
81. Britain is a member of the Consultative Group and of its per-
manent working committee, the Coordinating Committee (COCOM), an
organizational arrangement consisting of the NATO countries excluding
Iceland but including Japan. Accordingly, Britain enforces an embargo
on the export in East-West trade of a list of strategic items agreed to
by these countries. This British embargo is encompassed within this
paper's textual discussion of unilateral trade measures in the sense that
it is not part of any bilateral or multilateral obligation that the British
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granting export credit insurance only if the proposed transaction
meets certain commercial standards; and requiring certain trans-
actions where payment is deferred more than six months after
shipment of the goods to have an exchange control approval that
is granted only if certain conditions are met. As for imports,
the British government exerts influence chiefly through a
tariff and quota system.
C. LAw GOVENING AxGLO-SOVIT TRADE CONMTACTS
In Anglo-Soviet trade there exist neither inter-governmental
agreements specifying the trade8 2 nor inter-governmental agree-
ments providing general conditions of delivery. Therefore, a
British firm and a Soviet foreign trade corporation conclude a
contract 8 3 and draft its terms at their discretion.8 4 The con-
tracting British firm and Soviet foreign trade corporation are
free to determine the applicable law s and to refer possible dis-
putes to any tribunal for resolution.8 6 Soviet jurists naturally
regard the absence of an international trade law unified by the
governments as an impediment to effective contract drafting.
The contracting British and Soviet parties may, of course, use
standard contract forms and other documents formulating in-
ternational commercial custom.8 , In practice, especially in the
government owes to the Soviet government. Therefore, with regard to
the Soviet government, it is a trade measure that the British govern-
ment undertakes unilaterally.
82. See text accompanying notes 56-62 supra.
83. The Soviet foreign trade corporation, of course, may be operat-
ing under certain directions from the Soviet Foreign Trade Ministry.
84. For aid in obtaining the information used in this and other sec-
tions of the paper regarding the actual practice of Anglo-Soviet trade,
the author is indebted to Mr. David Winter, a solicitor of the Supreme
Court, London, and Visiting Lecturer in Soviet Law at the University
of Surrey, Guildford, England. Mr. Winter's expert and generous assist-
ance is herewith appreciatively acknowledged.
85. Neither English nor Soviet law requires that the law chosen
by the parties have a real connection with the contract Schmitthoff,
The Law of International Trade, its Growth, Formulation and Operation,
in SOURCES OF LAW, supra. note 3, at 3, 30. For one Soviet limitation on
the parties' choice of law for one aspect of the contract, see notes 90-97
and accompanying text infra.
86. In practice, when adjudication in a neutral third country is de-
sired, arbitration is often referred to the Arbitration Institute of the
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce or to the International Chamber of
Commerce in Paris. THE LONDON CHAMBER OF CoMm mCs, MEMORANDUI
ON CONTRACTS FOR THE EXPORT OF ENGINEERING PRODUCTS TO THE SOVIET
UNION 18 (1965); Winter, The Licensing of Know-How to the Soviet
Union, 1 J. WoRLD TRADE L. 162, 174-75 (1967).
87. Some of these standard contracts and documents are enumer-
ated in EAST EunoPEAw TRADE COUNCIL, CONTRACTS wrt EASTERN
1971]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
sale of certain goods traditional in Anglo-Soviet trade, these forms
and documents are frequently used.
Soviet conflict of laws or Soviet substantive law or both
may apply to a contract in Anglo-Soviet trade. Such applica-
tion may result from the parties' choice of law or of adjudicative
tribunal, or from their silence in the contract about choice of
law or of tribunal. s8 One possible problem is created by So-
viet private international law. This body of law provides: first,
that a contract is governed by the law of the place of contracting;
and second, that a contract made outside the Soviet Union will
not be considered invalid due to noncompliance with the foreign
law if there has been compliance with Soviet law.89 The distinc-
EUROPE 37-38 (1968), and in Schmitthoff, supra note 85, at 18-19. Fur-
ther, a Soviet foreign trade corporation often has its own individual
standard contract and, like a large market economy enterprise, tries to
impose it on the other party with the argument that any variation from
the standard contract would depart from well established precedents.
88. When Soviet law is applicable, the law applied is basically
Soviet general civil legislation. In addition, certain other isolated Soviet
legislative and administrative provisions may apply. S. PISAR, CO-
EXISTENCE AND COMMERCE 254-55 (1970). The relevant Soviet general
civil legislation is contained essentially in the one volume Russian
(RSFSR) Civil Code. R.S.F.S.R. 1964 GRAzH. KOD. (Civil Code), trans-
lated into English in W. GRAY & R. STULTS, CIVIL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN
SOVIET FEDERATED SOCIALIST REPUBLIC (1965).
The RSFSR is the one out of the 15 constituent Soviet Repub-
lics that includes Moscow, where most foreign trade transactions con-
cluded in the country are signed. Genkin, Znachenia Grazhdanskogo
Kodeksa RSFSR v Regulirovanii Otnoshenii po Vneshnei Torgovle (The
Role of the RSFSR Civil Code in the Regulation of Foreign Trade)
1965 SovETsKoE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO No. 2, at 51, 55 [translation
stated in the periodical]. The RSFSR also includes Leningrad, On the
infrequent occasion when the law of another of the Soviet Republics
would be applicable, the relevant portions of that Republic's civil
code would probably be the same as the corresponding portions of the
RSFSR Civil Code. Id.; Genkin, Nekotorye Pravovye Voprosy Obsh-
chikh Uslovii Postavok Tovarov SEV 1958 g. (Certain Legal Questions
of the Comecon 1958 General Conditions for the Delivery of Goods),
in 18 COLLECTION, supra note 49, at 3, 13.
The basis of each of the Republic's civil codes is found in OSNOVY
GRAZHDANSKOGO ZAKONODATEL'STVA SOIUZA SSR i SOIUZNYKH RESPUB-
LiK (FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LEGISLATION OF THE USSR AND
OF THE UNION REPUBLICS), translated into English in 14 CURRENT DiG.
SOVIET PRESS No. 4, Feb. 21, 1962, at 3, 20 [hereinafter cited as FUNDA-
MENTAL PRINCIPLES]. The RSFSR Civil Code, however, serves as a uni-
fied source of general civil legislation in the RSFSR applicable to for-
eign trade, because the RSFSR Civil Code essentially reproduces as well
as elaborates upon the Fundamental Principles. Genkin, The Role of the
RSFSR Civil Code in the Regulation of Foreign Trade, supra, at 55;
Genkin, Certain Legal Questions of the Comecon 1958 General Conditions
for the Delivery of Goods, supra, at 13.
89. R.S.F.S.R. 1964 GRAZH. KOD. (Civil Code), art. 565; FUNDAMENTAL
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five feature of Soviet private international law, however, is the
further rule that both the form of a contract concluded by a So-
viet corporation or any other Soviet organization in connection
with foreign trade, and the procedure for the Soviet organiza-
tion's signing, are governed by Soviet law regardless of where
the contract is concluded; noncompliance with Soviet law renders
the contract invalid 0
By this rule, Soviet law governs the form and procedure of
a Soviet corporation's conclusion of a foreign trade contract
purely because a Soviet corporation is a party to the contract.
Even though all other elements of the contract-place of contract-
ing, place of performance, etc.-have no connection with the So-
viet Union, Soviet law governs. No Western country, nor any
other East European country, has a similar requirement for
application of its own law to form and procedure.' 1
This Soviet conflicts rule is considered by Soviet jurists to
be binding on foreign as well as on Soviet courts. As theoreti-
cal justification for this universal applicability, Soviet jurists as-
sert that, because Soviet foreign trade is a state monopoly, its
conduct through the various Soviet state foreign trade corpora-
tions is a sovereign state function, entitled to the respect abroad
due a sovereign state function.9 -2
PRINCIPLES, supra note 88, art. 125; LuNz, SPECIAL PART, supra note
2, at 158, 162; LuNz, GENERAL PART, supra note 29, at 173-75.
90. FuNDAwtENTAL PRmcIPLEs, supra note 88, arts. 125, 14; R.S.F.S.R.
1964 GRAz. KoD. (Civil Code), arts. 565, 45. This rule applies only to
the form of a legal act and the procedure of a Soviet organization's
signing; the rights and obligations of a Soviet organization may, by
Soviet conflicts principles, be governed by foreign law without restric-
tion. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLEs, supra note 88, art. 126; R.S.F.S.R. 1964
GRA. KoD. (Civil Code), art. 566.
91. For the relevant East European law, see S. PisA, COExsTENCE
AND CONMMERCE 453 (1970).
92. LuNz, SPECIAL PART, supra note 2, at 157-62; LuNz, GENRAL
PART, supra note 29, at 175; RAwzArSEV, CONTRACT, supra note 4, at 23;
D. RAmzmnsEv, VNESHNETORGHOVYI ARBIrrRAZH v SSSR (FOREIGN TRADE
ARBrRATION IN NTHE USSR) 49-52 (1957) [hereinafter cited as RAwZAIT-
sEv, ARBITRATION (1957)]; Genkin, Arbitration, supra note 49, at 10;
Lunz, Conflicts, supra note 51, at 43-45; Ramzaitsev, The Law Applied
by Arbitration Tribunals-I, in SOURCES OF LAW, supra note 3, at 138,
142-43. Thus, in Soviet Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission deci-
sions, the basis given for applying this rule is not that it is some kind
of statute of frauds applicable in the Commission as part of the proce-
dural law of the forum. Rather, it is held to be a rule universally ap-
plicable to Soviet foreign trade contracts.
It has been pointed out by an American jurist that, with regard
to Soviet foreign trade corporations, Soviet theory here is inconsistent.
On the one hand, the Soviet Union claims that these corporations are so
separate from the state that each is liable only for its own individual
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The practical reason for this conflicts rule is that it enables
the Soviet central government to control Soviet foreign trade op-
erations more closely. Thus Soviet special foreign trade legisla-
tion requires all foreign trade contracts entered into by foreign
trade corporations to be in writing and signed by specified Soviet
officials.93  If the form and procedure for the execution of
obligations and not for those of the state or of the other state corpora-
tions, and that neither the state nor the other state corporations have
any liability for its obligations. But, on the other hand, the Soviet
Union claims these corporations are so closely tied to the state that this
Soviet contract execution rule deserves the respect accorded a sovereign
state function. S. PISAR, COEXISTENCE AND COMMERCE 452 (1970); Pisar,
Soviet Conflicts, supra note 51, at 654.
93. In general, two signatures are required. For foreign trade con-
tracts concluded by a Soviet foreign trade corporation in Moscow, one
signature must be by the president of the corporation or his deputy, and
the other by a person authorized to sign foreign trade contracts under
a power of attorney given by the president. A bill of exchange or any
other monetary obligation in foreign trade issued or assumed by a Soviet
foreign trade corporation in Moscow must be signed by either the cor-
poration's president or his deputy and also by the corporation's accoun-
tant general. If a contractor or bill of exchange or other monetary
obligation in foreign trade is entered into by a Soviet foreign trade cor-
poration outside Moscow, whether in the Soviet Union or in a foreign
country, the document must bear the signatures of two persons author-
ized to sign by a power of attorney given by the president of the corpo-
ration. Procedure for Signing Contracts and Issuing Powers of Attorneyfor the Execution of Operations in Foreign Trade (a decree of the Cen-
tral Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars USSR),
SOBRANIE ZAKONOV I RASPORIAZHENII SSSR (COLLECTION OF LAWS AND
REGULATIONS OF THE USSR), Oct. 13, 1930, [1930] No. 56, item 583, as
amended March 17, 1932, [1932] No. 20, item 119, as amended April 27,
1934, [1934] No. 23, item 178, as amended Dec. 26, 1935, [1936] No. 1,
item 3, as amended December 8, 1936, [1936] No. 62, item 459. See also
1 V. GsovsKi, SOVIET CIVIL LAW 470-71 (1948); LUNZ, SPECIAL PART,
supra note 2, at 158-59.
Similar regulations govern foreign trade contract signing by Soviet
trade delegations. See note 4 supra. In recent years, however, it is
normally a foreign trade corporation rather than a trade delegation that
is the Soviet party to a contract or other civil law obligation in foreign
trade. LUNZ, SPECIAL PART, supra note 2, at 66; RAMZAITSEV, CONTRACT,
supra note 4, at 17 n.1; USENKO, supra note 2, at 269. If, in foreign
trade, a Soviet trade delegation or one of its divisions in a foreign coun-
try enters into a contract, bill of exchange, any other type of monetary
obligation, or power of attorney, the document must have two signatures.
One must be by either the trade representative or by his deputy or,
with the authorization of the trade representative, by the head of a
division of the foreign trade delegation, and the other must be by a
member of the trade delegation whose name appears on a special list
approved by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and submitted to the USSR
Council of Ministers. Exceptions to the normal two signature require-
ment are that a trade representative can sign alone a contract involving
not more than 40,000 (new) rubles, and a contract involving more
than that amount if he has prior permission in each instance from
the Minister of Foreign Trade or his Deputy. The names of all persons
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Soviet foreign trade contracts were subject to a foreign law as
the law of the place of contracting or as the proper law of the
contract, Soviet central control could be upset. Foreign law
might, for example, validate an oral contract or contract signed
by an official possessing merely apparent or ostensible authority.
Consequently, the negligent or deliberately dishonest act of a
Soviet foreign trade corporation official could commit the Soviet
economy to a significant undesired obligation. It is to preclude
such interference by its own trade officials with its carefully
drafted foreign trade plan that the Soviet Union has established
its conflicts rule. The protection provided by the rule is the
subjection of every Soviet foreign trade contract to the Soviet
requirements of a written form ordinarily bearing the signatures
of two authorized officials. 94
This Soviet conflicts rule has on occasion, however, presented
a problem in Soviet trade with market economy countries. A
number of Soviet Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission cases
have dealt with the matter. Each has involved a foreign trade
able to sign a legal obligation on behalf of a trade delegation or one of
its divisions are required to be given to the government to which the
delegation or division is accredited and to be published in an appropri-
ate press organ of that country. Procedure for Signing Contracts and
Issuing Powers of Attorney for the Execution of Operations in Foreign
Trade (a decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council
of People's Commissars USSR), SoBaRAxN ZAKONOV I RAsPORLAzHENI
SSSR (CoLCTioN OF LAws AN REcULATIONS OF THE USSR), Oct. 13,
1930, [1930] No. 56, item 583, as amended March 17, 1932, [1932] No. 20,
item 119, as amended April 27, 1934, [1934] No. 23, item 178, as amended
Dec. 26, 1935, [1936] No. 1, item 3, as amended Dec. 8, 1936, [1936) No.
62, item 459. See also 1 V. Gsovsxr, SOVIET CrvIL Lv 470-71 (1948);
LuNz, SPEcIAL PART, supra note 2, at 158-59.
A further publication provision is that the names of all persons em-
powered to sign foreign trade obligations for a trade delegation or a
division of a delegation or for a foreign trade corporation must be pub-
lished in the official journal of the Foreign Trade Ministry. At the
present time this journal is VNsHNiA TORGOVLA (the spelling of the
title used in the journal's English language edition). A person's power
to sign does not arise until such publication. FOREIGN TRADE MINMTRY,
VNEsENiA TORGOVLA.
Regarding the overall Soviet requirement of a written form with
certain authorized signatures, other Comecon countries apparently do not
have comparable rules for foreign trade contract execution, except for
Bulgaria and Rumania, which require a written form. Goldstajn, The
Formation of the Contract, in UNmCATiON OF THE LAw GOVERNNG
INTEPRATIONAL SALES OF GOODS 41, 43-44 (J. Honnold ed. 1966) [com-
plete work hereinafter cited as UNFcATION OF LAw]; Summary of the
Proceedings, in UNurCATION OF LAw, supra, at 365, 374-75. Contra, LuNz,
SPECIAL PART, supra note 2, at 157.
94. See S. PISAR, COEXISENCE AND COMMEmRcE 452 (1970); Pisar,
Soviet Conflicts, supra note 51, at 655.
1971]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
contract allegedly agreed to by a Soviet corporation but not
executed in full compliance with the Soviet form and proced-
ure requirements. In every relevant case the Commission has de-
clared that Soviet law governed the Soviet corporation's foreign
trade contract execution (regardless of other factors, such as the
place of execution) and has held invalid any contract violating the
Soviet requirements.
The issue in these reported cases was either whether an ex-
change of oral or written communications between the parties
established any contractual relationship, or whether a basic con-
tract acknowledged by both parties as binding was to be inter-
preted or supplemented by additional communications. In all
the cases any oral communications were held powerless to estab-
lish or modify any foreign trade contract, because Soviet law re-
quires a writing. Any written communications were held to
create or supplement a valid contractual relationship only when
signed by the duly authorized Soviet foreign trade corporation
representatives.
Thus, by Soviet doctrine, not only the original foreign tradc
contract, but also any alleged amendment must satisfy the Soviet
form and procedure requirements. 5 If the Soviet corpora-
tion's execution of a foreign trade contract or amendment fails
to satisfy these requirements, the resulting invalidity cannot be
95. Ishchenko & Zatsepin, Dogovor Vneshnetorgovoi Kupli-Prodazhi
(Contract of Foreign Trade Purchase and Sale), in THE LEGAL REGULA-
TION OF FOREIGN TRADE OF = USSR 104, 110 (D. Genkin ed. 1961).
As to the existence of any contractual relationship at all, in Hoffman
(Swiss merchant) v. V/O Machinoimport (Soviet corporation) (1956),
described in Ramzaitsev, supra note 92, at 143-44, in RAMZAITSEV, ARDI-
TRATION (1957), supra note 92, at 55, and in LUNZ, SPECIAL PART, supra
note 2, at 161, plaintiff Swiss merchant claimed a valid contract with
defendant Soviet foreign trade corporation. Plaintiff lost because the
basis of the alleged contract-oral negotiations and written proposals
by plaintiff that had not been confirmed in writing by defendant-did
not satisfy the Soviet requirements of a writing signed by the proper
Soviet corporation officials. But in Fanto Petroleum Maatschappij
(Dutch firm) v. V/O Soiuznefteksport (Soviet corporation) (1940),
described in note 97 and accompanying text infra, the Dutch plaintiff
successfully established a contract based on an exchange of written
communications between the parties.
With regard to the interpretation of an acknowledged valid contract,
both the Canadian plaintiff in a 1938 case and the Soviet defendant in a
1937 case lost on their claim that the contract should be interpreted in
accordance with oral negotiations occurring at the time of concluding
the contract. A & P Import Co. (Canadian firm) v. V/O Raznoeksport
(Soviet corporation) (1938), in LuNz, SPECIAL PART, supra note 2, at 161,
and in D. RAmzAITSEV, VNESHNETORGOvyi ARBITRAZH V SSSR (FoREIGN
TRADE ARBITRATION IN THE USSR) 33 (1952) [hereinafter cited as RAM-
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cured by any subsequent actions of the corporation indicating an
acceptance of the agreement for fulfillment except by subse-
quent proper written execution of the contract or amendment.20
Z.ITSEV, ARBITRATION (1952)]; Kattenburg (Dutch firm) v. V/O Tek-
noeksport (Soviet corporation) (1937), in Lunz, Conflicts, supra note 51,
at 44-45, and in RAMvAimEv, ARBITRATON (1952), supra, at 33.
Three other plaintiffs failed in attempts to supplement an acknowl-
edged valid contractual relationship with alleged additional contrac-
tual agreements, because the alleged additional agreements lacked com-
pliance with the Soviet form and procedure requirements. In Schenker
and Co. (French company) v. V/O Raznoimport (Soviet corporation)
(1937), described in Lunz, Conflicts, supra note 51, at 44, in LuNz, SPE-
ciAL PART, supra note 2, at 160-61, in RAMZArsEV, ARBTATION (1957),
supra note 92, at 53, and in RAMZArSEV, ARBTATION (1952), supra, at
32, plaintiff French company, having rendered defendant Soviet cor-
poration certain transportation services, sued unsuccessfully for reim-
bursement of costs incurred by it in excess of the costs specified in the
original contract. The unsuccessful claim was based on an alleged oral
promise made in France by the Soviet corporation's president.
In the second case, V/O Soiuznefteksport (Soviet corporation) v.
Degviela (joint stock company-nationality not stated) (1940), described
in RAmzAITSEV, ARBrmATIoN (1957), supra note 92, at 54-55, plaintiff
Soviet seller claimed that, after it had shipped the merchandise sold, the
parties made an additional agreement that defendant buyer was to return
the merchandise to the port of loading. Plaintiffs claim failed because
it was based on an exchange of telegrams and letters which, on plaintiffs
side, had not been signed by the appropriate Soviet corporation offi-
cials according to Soviet law. For the same reason plaintiff Belgian
buyer in Maurice Dever (Belgian firm) v. V/O Eksportles (Soviet cor-
poration) (1951), described in RAMZAITsEV, ARBnTRATION (1957), supra
note 92, at 55, lost on its claim. The quantity of merchandise to be
delivered, plaintiff argued unsuccessfully, was to be determined by
certain communications between the parties in addition to an original
contract together with a supplementary agreement. But the additional
communications failed to have this claimed legal effect because by
Soviet law they had not been properly executed by the Soviet defendant.
However, V/O Eksportkhleb (Soviet corporation) v. Romano Pal'-
ian i Fratelli (Italian firm) (1962), 15 COLLECTION, supra note 49, at 58-59
(1964), represents a departure from the Soviet Foreign Trade Arbitra-
tion Commission's reliance on the universal applicability of the Soviet
form and procedure requirements. In that case defendant Italian buyer,
after having accepted part of a contractual shipment of oats, refused to
accept further shipments. Defendant alleged that the parties, after the
part performance, had orally agreed in Rome to cancel the remainder of
the contract. Plaintiff Soviet seller denied any such oral agreement and
sued for losses resulting from defendant's refusal to accept further ship-
ments. The Soviet Arbitration Commission, deciding in favor of plaintiff,
concluded that no valid agreement canceling the contract had been
reached. But the Commission based its conclusion wholly on a clause
in the original contract requiring that any change be executed in written
form and signed by duly authorized representatives; the Commission
said nothing about the Soviet form and procedure requirements.
96. RAwMzAISEV, CONTRACT, supra note 4, at 23-24; Genkin, Arbi-
tration, supra note 49, at 10. Similarly, the Soviet Foreign Trade Arbi-
tration Commission considers the form and procedure of execution of a
foreign trade contract by a foreign organization to be governed by the
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The Soviet form and procedure requirements can, however,
be met by any writing containing the essential contractual terms,
provided that the document committing the Soviet corporation is
signed by authorized officials. The writing can consist of one or
several separate documents. In one case the Soviet Foreign Trade
Arbitration Commission held that an exchange of correspon-
dence between a Soviet foreign trade corporation and a foreign
firm constituted a valid contract. The Soviet corporation had
objected that the correspondence was merely preparation for a
possible subsequent contract conclusion, but the Commission over-
domestic law of that foreign organization's country. Therefore, con-
cludes the Commission, if the foreign country's law does not contain a
special imperative rule controlling the execution of foreign trade con-
tracts by that country's organizations, legal acceptance of a foreign trade
contract by such an organization can be deduced from its actions rec-
ognizing the contract as binding. Genkin, Arbitration, supra note 49,
at 10-11.
Thus, in V/O Soiuznefteksport (Soviet corporation) v. A. Moroni i
A. Keller (Italian company) (1960), 11 COLLECTION, supra note 49, at 41
(1961), plaintiff Soviet seller sued defendant Italian buyer for breach
of two contracts. Defendant pleaded invalidity of the contracts, alleg-
ing they had been signed for defendant by a person without authority to
bind the Italian company, and force majeure. The Soviet Arbitration
Commission found that the contracts had in fact been signed for de-
fendant by an unauthorized official of the company. But the Commis-
sion concluded that defendant buyer had nevertheless subsequently obli-
gated itself to the contracts through acceptance of partial shipments
made by plaintiff seller on both contracts and through a letter to plain-
tiff signed by defendant Italian company's president. In this letter the
president, who was authorized to conclude the contracts at issue, recog-
nized non-performance by defendant of contractual obligations but
pleaded force majeure.
Apparently the Commission believed it could hold defendant to the
contracts, through the acceptance of partial shipments and the letter, on
the basis of general principles of civil law. Evidently the Commission
thought such general principles applied because of the apparent absence
in Italian law of any contrary rule restricting the manner in which an
Italian company could become bound to a contract. See Genkin, Arbi-
tration, supra note 49, at 10-11. (The Commission also rejected de-
fendant's force majeure plea.)
It is the type of acceptance of an invalidly executed contract as in
the Moroni i Keller case that, by the Soviet view, could never be charged
to a Soviet foreign trade corporation. Soviet law would apply, by the
Soviet view, and it recognizes no foreign trade contract acceptance by the
Soviet party other than through the formally prescribed written execu-
tion. RAMZAITSEV, CONTRACT, supra note 4, at 23-24; Genkin, Arbitration,
supra note 49, at 10. Ramzaitsev, however, interpreted the Moroni i
Keller case differently from the above summary in this note, relying
heavily on facts not contained in the above cited COLLECTION's ac-
count of the Soviet Arbitration Commission decision. RAMZAITSEV,
CONTRACT, supra note 4, at 34-37; Ramzaitsev, supra note 92, at 145;
Ramzaitsev, The Application of Private International Law in Soviet For-
eign Trade Practice, 1961 J. Bus. L. 343, 346-47.
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ruled the objection because the correspondence as a whole ex-
pressed agreement on the essential terms of a contract and the
letter sent by the Soviet corporation confirming the agreement
had been signed by the officials authorized to sign foreign trade
contracts. In making its decision the Commission chose Soviet
law as the controlling law.97
What would happen if a case involving an alleged foreign
trade contract agreed to orally by Soviet officials who were au-
thorized under Soviet law to commit their corporation only in
writing9s were to be litigated before an English tribunal?00 The
outcome would be uncertain.100 Under Soviet doctrine, the
English tribunal should apply Soviet foreign trade contract ex-
ecution law because foreign trade is a function of the sovereign
Soviet state. According to this law, the contract orally agreed to
by the Soviet side would be invalid.
The English tribunal, however, regardless of Soviet doctrine,
might characterize the issue of the contract's validity as relat-
ing to formal validity. Then the alleged contract would be held
valid under English conflicts law if it satisfied the requirements
97. Fanto Petroleum Maatschappil (Dutch firm) v. V/O Soiuzneft-
eksport (Soviet corporation) (1940), in Lunz, Conflicts, supra note 51, at
45, in Ramzaitsev, supra note 92, at 143, in RAMzArrSEV, AnnrrnATIoN(1952), supra note 92, at 53-54, and in RAmZAIT5EV, ARBrrRArzoN (1952),
supra note 95, at 33-34. In this case defendant Soviet seller had offered
by telegram to sell paraffin to plaintiff Dutch buyer, having indicated in
the telegram the time and conditions of delivery and the price. Plain-
tiff had accepted the offer by a telegram and letter. Defendant had then
by letter suggested additional conditions and had confirmed the sale
based on plaintiff's acceptance of these additional conditions. Plaintiff
had accepted the additional conditions, and subsequently brought suit to
enforce the agreement thus arrived at. Defendant contended that the
exchange of correspondence was simply preparation for a contract sign-
ing. The Soviet Arbitration Commission rejected this defense and held
the alleged agreement legally established. The parties' correspondence
indicated a consensus on the essential points of the contract, the Com-
mission said, and the letter from defendant confirming the sale based on
plaintiff's acceptance of the proposed additional conditions had been
signed by the officials authorized to bind defendant Soviet corporation
to foreign trade contracts.
98. Other kinds of noncompliance with the Soviet foreign trade
contract execution law are possible. For example, a contract might
be signed for a Soviet foreign trade corporation by Soviet officials pos-
sessing only apparent or ostensible authority.
99. The comments on English conflict law in the text following
this note were written with the help of Mr. Peter Z. Rona, U. of Pa.
(B.A.); Oxford (B.A. in Law). The author is gratefully indebted to Mr.
Rona for his assistance.
100. Schmitthoff, The Law of International Trade, its Growth,
Formulation and Operation, in SouRcEs or LAW, supra note 3, at 3, 9-10.
No English cases directly on point could be found.
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either of the law of the country where it was made or of the
proper law of the contract. 101 Either law could easily be other
than Soviet law. If for example, one were English law, an
oral contract could be held valid nothwithstanding the different
requirements of the Soviet law and its claimed universal ap-
plicability. 10 2
The English tribunal might well, on the other hand, char-
acterize the issue as relating to the capacity of the relevant Soviet
officials to bind the Soviet corporation. 0 3  Then by English
conflicts law the alleged contract would be governed both by its
proper law and by the charter of the corporation.' 0 4  The Soviet
corporation's charter would probably provide that the corpora-
tion's foreign trade contracts must be signed by two particular
officials. 10 5 Consequently, the English tribunal might enforce
that restriction, refuse to allow the authority of these officials to
be enlarged by the proper law of the contract and hold that the
officials did not have even apparent or ostensible authority to
commit their corporation by oral agreement. 00
The decision could thus turn on the English tribunal's charac-
terization of the issue: is it a matter of formal validity, or
of the capacity of the Soviet corporation officials? By what
law the English tribunal would make this characterization is
not clear.'0 7  If the English tribunal referred to Soviet law for
the characterization as formal validity or capacity, just what
the characterization would be by Soviet law is also not clear.'0 8
101. A. DIcEY & J. MORRIS, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 749-54 (8th ed.
1967); G. CHESIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 205-06 (7th ed.
1965).
102. Schmitthoff, supra note 100, at 10.
103. Id. at 9-10.
104. A. DIcEY & J. MORRIS, supra note 101, at 484-87, 744-49; G.
CHESHIRE, supra note 101, at 179-82, 200-02.
105. J. HAZARD & I. SHAPIRO, THE SOVIET LEGAL SYsTEmI pt. 2, at 85
(1962); Berman, The Legal Framework of Trade Between Planned and
Market Economies: The Soviet-American Example, 24 LAW & CoN-
TEMP. PROB. 482, 487 n.16 (1959).
106. A. DICEY & J. MoRIus, supra note 101, at 484-87; G. CiEmIRE,
supra note 101, at 179-82. In a Bulgarian-Swiss arbitration conducted
apparently in the early 1960's under the auspices of the International
Chamber of Commerce, it was evidently held that the state foreign trade
corporation was not bound by the alleged contract because its manager
had lacked the authority to bind it orally. Lagergren, Formation of
Contract, in UNIFICATION OF LAW, supra note 93, at 55, 71.
107. A. DIcEY & J. MORRIS, supra note 101, at 19-33; G. CHESHIRE,
supra note 101, at 40-45.
108. That the Soviet characterization would be formal validity is
suggested by the language of the Soviet statutory provisions (FUNDA-
MENTAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 88, arts. 125, 14; R.S.F.S.R. 1964 GRAZu.
[Vol. 56:1
SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE
If the English tribunal ultimately characterized the issue as
relating to capacity and enforced the restriction in the Soviet
corporate charter, this restriction would probably be enforced
as an application of English conflicts law. It would probably
not be enforced as an English acceptance of the Soviet-claimed
universal applicability of its foreign trade contract execution
law. The reason for not accepting the Soviet claim is the addi-
tional burden it would place on British businessmen in Anglo-
Soviet trade. At present they must be familiar with the proper
law of the contract and possibly with the law of the country
where the contract is made, neither of which might be Soviet law,
as well as with the charter of the Soviet corporation. Acceptance
of the principle that Soviet law would apply other than as the
proper law of the contract or as the law of the country where
the contract is made would force British businessmen to be fa-
miliar with Soviet law in every case.
If the non-Soviet party wants to comply with the Soviet
requirement that a foreign trade contract be in written form
with certain authorized signatures, however, the further prob-
lem of ascertaining what individuals may sign is not difficult.
There are only 52 Soviet foreign trade corporations, 10 9 and the
names of the individuals authorized to bind these corporations
are published in Vneshnia Torgovla, the English language edi-
tion of the Soviet Foreign Trade Ministry's journal.110 In prac-
tice, the Soviet special foreign trade contract execution law does
not seem to have created particular difficulties for British firms.
KOD. (Civil Code), arts. 565, 45) and by Soviet legal writings such as
Ramzaitsev, supra note 92, at 142-45. That the Soviet characterization
would not be an either-or choice between formal validity and capacity,
but rather would be a kind of procedural validity that subsumes Anglo-
American concepts of both formal validity and capacity, is suggested by
Soviet legal writings such as LuNz, SPEcIAL PART, supra note 2, at 157-62.
The procedural validity view is probably the better statement of the
Soviet position.
109. The number of these corporations has been increasing steadily
during the postwar period.
110. See generally S. PIsAR, COEXISTENCE AND CoMnmcE 452-53
(1970); Pisar, Soviet Conflicts, supra note 51, at 655. The spelling in
the text is that used by the journal for the title of its English language
edition. Soviet special foreign trade legislation requires publication in
the Foreign Trade Ministry's journal of the names of all persons au-
thorized to sign for the foreign trade corporations and the trade dele-
gations, and a person's authority to sign does not arise until such publi-
cation. See note 93 supra. This requirement, however, since it is a pro-
vision of Soviet internal law could be unilaterally changed by the Soviet
Union at any time.
In the everyday conduct of Anglo-Soviet trade, a contract for a
Soviet foreign trade corporation is sometimes signed by Soviet officials
19711
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D. COMPARISON WITH COMECON TRADE
As a whole, the legal structure of Anglo-Soviet trade is
similar to market economy rather than to Comecon foreign
trade. At the inter-governmental level, the British and Soviet
governments undertake no responsibility to specify or ensure
what trade will take place. Similarly, the British and Soviet
governments have established no unified general conditions of
delivery determining commercial terms of contracts between
British firms and Soviet corporations. In the event of defaults
or disputes in these contractual relations the governments make
no intercession through their foreign trade ministries to resolve
them.
Anglo-Soviet trade is also similar to market economy trade
at the level of the contracting parties. From the standpoint
of a British firm, contracting with a Soviet foreign trade corpora-
tion as a strictly legal matter is substantially like contracting
with an enterprise of a market economy. For the British firm
the juridical status of the Soviet foreign trade corporation as an
independent legal entity separate from the Soviet central gov-
ernment-however close the administrative connection may be-
has an important advantage: in the event of commercial dispute
the British firm can press judicial suit or arbitration free of sov-
ereign immunity questions."' In practice, in Anglo-Soviet
trade litigation is rare because the Soviet corporations are known
for faithful observance of their contracts and for amicable settle-
prior to publication of their names in VNESHNIA TORCOVLA. In such a
circumstance, a written power of attorney may subsequently be issued
on behalf of the president of the corporation confirming that the offi-
cials had authority to sign for the corporation prior to or as of the date
of the contract execution. The power of attorney may also confirm that
the names of the officials will be published in due course in VNESHNIA
TORGOVLA. In any of these various situations, whatever the strict legal
effect under Soviet law, the Soviet corporation scrupulously honors its
contract, in keeping with the high reputation of Soviet corporations for
honoring their foreign trade contracts. But see S. PISAR, COEXISTENCE
AND COMMERcE 285 (1970).
The Anglo-Soviet Commercial Agreement of Feb. 16, 1934, art. 5(5),
[1934] Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 11 (CMD. 4567), 149 L.N.T.S. 445, 452, pro-
vides for publication in the Board of Trade Journal of the names of
those authorized to sign for the Soviet Trade Delegation. This pro-
vision, however, has little value today, because the Soviet party to a
foreign trade contract now is normally not the Trade Delegation but a
foreign trade corporation. See note 4 supra. LUNZ, SPECIAL PART, supra
note 2, at 66; RAmZAITSEV, CONTRAcT, supra note 4, at 17 n.1; UsENicO,
supra note 2, at 269.
111. See Berman, supra note 105, at 490, 494 n.35; Pisar, Soviet Con-
flicts, supra note 51, at 643.
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ment of the infrequent disputes without resort to suit or arbitra-
tion.ii1
The Soviet foreign trade corporation's financial independence
of the Soviet state treasury makes the corporation in this re-
spect comparable to a market economy enterprise. That each
Soviet corporation is alone liable for its obligations out of the
limited assets entrusted to it by the central government and that
the Soviet state treasury bears no responsibility for the corpora-
tion's obligations is not a significant problem for the British
firm; Anglo-Soviet trade experience has demonstrated that
Soviet corporations meet their payment obligations punctu-
ally.1 3 One purpose, of course, of Soviet central planning of for-
eign trade and the especially close Soviet central control over all
foreign exchange transactions is to assure availability of the
foreign exchange necessary to meet the corporations' foreign ob-
ligations. The Soviet government is aware that a default by
one Soviet corporation would reflect sharply on the credit stand-
ing of all"11 4
From the standpoint of a Soviet foreign trade corporation,
contracting with a British firm as a strictly legal matter dif-
fers significantly from contracting with a corporation of a Come-
con country. The absence of any inter-governmental long term
agreement or protocol between administrative superiors that en-
visions conclusion of a contract creates uncertainty as to whether
any contract will ever be agreed to by the negotiating Soviet
corporation and British firm. Further, the absence of any uni-
fied general conditions of delivery requires the contracting par-
ties themselves to draft the commercial terms of any contract,
and any dispute must be resolved without governmental inter-
vention.
IV. FUTURE TRENDS
A. COMECON FOREIGN TRADE
The distinguishing feature of centrally planned economy for-
eign trade-that the central government determines what trade
112. See generally S. PISAR COEXISTENCE AND CobnMMcE 283-87
(1970).
113. See id.; EAST EuROPEAN TRADE COUNCIL, CONTRACTS WITH EAST-
ERN EUROPE 61 (1968); Pisar, Soviet Conflicts, supra note 51, at 643-44.
But see S. PisAR, COEXISTENCE AND COMMERCE 266-67, 492 (1970).
114. See S. PisAR, COEXISTENCE AND COMIMIERCE 284-85 (1970); Pisar,
The Communist System of Foreign-Trade Adjudication, 72 HA~v. L. REV.
1409, 1434, 1468-69 (1959).
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will take place and promises to ensure fulfillment of this trade' II
-is undergoing some modification in Comecon. The motive be-
hind the change is the desire for more efficiency. As in the cur-
rent domestic economic reforms in the Comecon countries,
greater efficiency is being sought through permitting state cor-
porations to exercise authority reserved formerly for the central
government.
In the case of foreign trade, this development means espe-
cially that the inter-governmental long term trade agreements
and annual protocols no longer always specify in detail all the
types of goods to be exchanged. Instead, they sometimes specify
the goods only by broad categories, allowing the foreign trade
corporations to fill in the details. An annual protocol, for exam-
ple, may now indicate only that a certain value of machine tools
is to be sold by one country to the other. What kinds of machine
tools will be sold, and the amount of each kind, are determined by
the two foreign trade corporations." It was formerly the
central governments through the foreign trade ministries that
normally made these decisions as to kinds by spelling them out
in the agreements and protocols.
In the system of central government decision making for all
details, certain problems have arisen. A basic difficulty is the
foreign trade ministry's slowness and remoteness from actual
trade. The ministry cannot possibly keep abreast of all the cur-
rent developments regarding each of the many exports and im-
ports handled by the foreign trade corporations. These fast-
changing events can be followed adequately only by the foreign
trade corporation specializing in the particular goods involved.
Further, even insofar as the ministry is able to keep track of cur-
rent happenings, it can utilize this knowledge in arranging the
country's foreign trade only through the trade agreements
and protocols. This process makes it impossible to react quickly
to developments because the protocol for each year has to be
drafted well in advance of the year and is usually signed in
the preceding autumn. The annual protocol can be, and often is,
amended during the year of its operation, but this procedure
is cumbersome and fails to provide enough flexibility.' 1 7
Authorizing the foreign trade corporations to determine
through their contracts the particular kinds of goods that will
115. See text accompanying notes 22-25 supra.
116. See Katona, supra note 4, at 230 n.10.
117. See text accompanying notes 13-18 supra.
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be traded within each broad category improves this situation.
Each corporation is a specialist in certain goods and can de-
cide which contracts to enter into and which to reject on short
notice, and the contracts are executed less in advance of ac-
tual deliveries than the protocol. Each corporation is moti-
vated to negotiate commercially advantageous contracts because
the corporation is now judged partly on the profitability of its
operation.118
The role of the foreign trade corporations is growing in
other ways as well." 9 They are being increasingly consulted
by the foreign trade ministry as to what goods should be included
in the inter-governmental agreements. When the corporations
draft a contract deviating on some point from a provision in the
annual trade protocol, there is increasing validation of the con-
tractual provision as against the protocol provision.12 0  In the
event of nondelivery on a contract, the civil liability issue is now
normally resolved by the corporations and not by the foreign
trade ministries.' 2 ' When two corporations cannot agree on a
contract for a delivery designated in the annual protocol, resolu-
tion of this problem may still, however, have to come through the
foreign trade ministries.1
22
One long range development that would greatly enlarge the
role of the foreign trade corporations would be for the inter-gov-
ernmental agreements to omit specifying the value of each cate-
gory of goods to be exchanged. Instead, the total value for each
category as well as the kinds of goods within it could be left to
the foreign trade corporations. At present the Comecon govern-
ments roughly balance their Comecon trade on a bilateral basis
by normally specifying in each inter-governmental agreement a
value for each category of goods listed. They are working to de-
velop a multilateral balancing system. 23
If the Comecon governments were to leave the value of trade
118. See text accompanying notes 48-53 supra.
119. At the same time that the foreign trade corporations are gaining
some authority reserved formerly for the central government, they are,
however, sometimes losing authority to domestic operating enterprises.
As an additional move to give more authority to the organization closest
to the matter at issue, in Eastern Europe some of these larger operating
enterprises are being empowered to export and import directly rather
than only through the middlemen foreign trade corporations, as was re-
quired in the past. See note 4 supra.
120. See text accompanying notes 37-40 supra.
121. See text accompanying notes 44-55 supra.
122. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
123. See notes 9 and 15 and accompanying text supra.
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in the bilateral arrangements to determination by the foreign
trade corporations, a government could still influence the trade
through export and import licensing, foreign exchange controls
and tariffs.1 24 In addition, the government would always retain
the ultimate control of administrative supervision. Thus the gov-
ernment could at any time control a corporation's exporting or im-
porting in any given case simply by issuing a direct (and possibly
secret) administrative order.12 5
The present modification of the Comecon foreign trade sys-
tem to enlarge the role of the foreign trade corporations is pro-
ceeding at a different pace in the different Comecon countries.
The modification is most advanced in Hungary, with Poland and
Czechoslovakia coming next. In the Soviet Union change is
coming more slowly, partly because the domestic economic re-
form is less advanced there, and partly because foreign trade is
less important to the Soviet economy, so that obtaining maximum
efficiency in foreign trade receives less attention. Strict central
government control over foreign trade also has deep historical
roots in the Soviet Union. At the very outset of the Soviet era,
Lenin saw this control as the only sure way to protect the
Soviet economy from domination by the then more powerful
market economy countries. 1 26 Protection of the Soviet domestic
economy through the traditional method of tariffs, as advocated
by Bukharin, was condemned by Lenin as totally inadequate.' 2 7
Although Soviet industry has developed mightily since those
early years, the determination of the Soviet central government
to plan and control foreign trade directly is softening very slowly.
In the Soviet Union as well as in Eastern Europe, however,
the present movement is clearly toward reducing the authority
124. If, for example, a foreign trade corporation were authorized to
decide from which Comecon country to import certain goods, were to
seek these imports where the cost was least in order to maximize
corporate profitability and were to receive no credit for the central gov-
ernment's tariff collections, tariffs could affect the corporation's import
buying decisions. Thereby MFN could acquire meaning in a Comecon
country. See text accompanying notes 63-80 supra.
125. See Domke & Hazard, State Trading and the Most-Favored-Na-
tion Clause, 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 55, 67 (1958).
126. 27 V. LENIN, COLLECTED WoRxs 252 (1965); 33 V. LENIN, COL-
LECTED WoRxs 455-59 (1966); Hazard, State Trading in History and The-
ory, 24 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 243, 245-46 (1959).
127. 33 V. LENIN, COLLECTED WoRxs 455-59 (1966); Hazard, supra
note 126, at 245. For one difficulty recently encountered by Yugoslavia
in moving from a centrally planned toward a market economy in foreign
trade, see THE EcoNoMist, June 8, 1968, at 42. The difficulty there de-
scribed is alleged "dumping" by Comecon countries.
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of the central government and enlarging the authority of the for-
eign trade corporations. This change moves the legal structure of
Comecon foreign trade in the direction of the legal structure used
by market economies, although the differences remain signifi-
cant.
B. MARE ECONOMY FOREIGN TRADE AND
ANGLo-SovET TRADE
The market economy foreign trade legal structure is moving
slightly toward the centrally planned economy example. In
Comecon foreign trade the role of the central government is de-
creasing; in market economy foreign trade, it is increasing. With-
in the twentieth century, first World War I, then the depres-
sion of the 1930's, then World War II and balance of payments
and monetary problems have led to a growing responsibility
for the market economy government. 128 Decisions of which
goods in what quantities will be traded are still basically the
domain of the market economy enterprises, with the government's
providing only the legal framework within which these deci-
sions are made. But the typical market economy government
has circumscribed somewhat the enterprises' domain in order,
for example, that the net national result of all the enterprises'
individual decisions will have certain balance of payments char-
acteristics.
In Anglo-Soviet trade the Soviet Union accepts what is es-
sentially the treaty framework used between market economy
countries.12 9 This situation will probably continue. From the
British standpoint, the gradual easing of Cold War tensions les-
sens any need for the British government to make an exception
for East-West trade to its traditional policy of allowing British
enterprises to determine their own foreign trade. From the
Soviet standpoint, the present arrangement is workable. The ab-
sence of any inter-governmental commitments as to what and
how much trade there will be makes the central planning of
foreign trade less precise. Less precision, however, though to a
much smaller degree, is coming to characterize the central plan-
ning of trade between two Comecon countries as well.
128. See generally Hazard, supra note 126, at 243-55.
129. See text accompanying notes 56-62 supra.
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